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The contemporary Salafist movement idealizes the Rightly Guided Caliphate.  Given the 
tumultuous nature of the period and the grandeur of the Golden Age of Islam that 
occurred several centuries later, its veneration seems paradoxical.  To explain the reality 
of the Rightly Guided Caliphate and the reasoning behind its emulation, this study 
explores both the traditional historical account and the contemporary Salafist narrative of 
the period.  Comparative analysis indicates that the period is revered, despite the 
paradoxical turmoil and violence associated with it, because it is perceived as the summit 
of both spiritual purity and temporal power in Islamic history.  Contemporary Salafists 
long for a resurgence of Muslim power in the world but do not want to sacrifice religious 
purity to obtain it.  The Rightly Guided Caliphate epitomizes this notion because its 
earliest generation was the most pure, in terms of the practice of Islam, of any Muslim 
generation. In addition, its seemingly miraculous expansion signified enormous temporal 
power—relative to its competitors, who have since overtaken them—that is easily 
romanticized.  Much of the period’s violence is omitted from the narrative to protect an 
idealized remembrance of the state’s power, not its religious unity. 
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religion of peace.  Like every major religion, Islam has a minority of extremists who 
pervert its principles for their own evil goals.  And like the vast preponderance of all 
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Since its emergence in the late nineteenth century, Salafism has significantly 
influenced modern Islamic thought, and by extension, the Muslim world’s interaction 
with the West.  As an ideology, Salafism explains that the religious, social, and political 
divisions that occurred within Islam after its formative period are the consequences of 
straying from the Qur’an and the teachings and actions of the Prophet as they were 
interpreted by his companions.1  Contemporary Salafists believe that the only way to 
correct these problems is to purify Muslim society by harkening back to this formative 
period and reviving a form of Islam based solely on this early interpretation of the Qur’an 
and Sunna.2   
Contemporary Salafism is not a monolith.  It has undergone a significant 
transformation in recent years, evolving from a completely apolitical movement into one 
with active and successful political parties.  Its ideology has been adopted by and 
influenced the development of many different groups, both political and violent, who 
seek to achieve this purification.  Regardless of their chosen means to attain this goal, all 
contemporary Salafists share an important characteristic: they emulate the formative 
period of Islam—including the significantly tumultuous Rightly Guided Caliphate 
period.3  The question at hand is why; a dispassionate study of the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate indicates significant religious and political turmoil, highlighted by the 
assassination of three of the four ruling caliphs, intense fighting amongst the Prophet’s 
companions, and the origination of the sectarian divide between Sunni and Shi’a.  To 
address these issues, this study poses the following research question: why do 
contemporary Salafists view the formative period of Islam, including the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate, as an ideal worth emulating, and what was the reality of the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate?  
                                                 
1 Mohammed Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 
Press, 2011), 6–8. 
2 Ibid.; John Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 160.  
3 Ayoob, Political Islam, 7. 
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A. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
For today’s national security professionals, the contemporary operating 
environment poses tremendous challenges.  The bipolar international order characteristic 
of the Cold War has been replaced by what our National Security Strategy defines as a 
“multi-modal world” influenced by “shifting, interest-driven coalitions” and “challenged 
by [both] state and non-state actors.”4  Those responsible for national security planning, 
coordination, and execution alike, no matter what their specific roles may be, must now 
confront a wider array of challenges including terrorism, insurgency, crime, proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, and other asymmetric threats, sometimes concurrent 
with high intensity conflict.  They must also work within a multi-dimensional 
environment that requires a greater appreciation of complex human terrain, a burgeoning 
cyber domain, and the global effects of rapid technological change.  It is within this 
environment that national security professionals must thrive, but like their Cold War 
predecessors, many are guilty of oversimplifying concepts they choose not to understand.  
Time and policy errors revealed that international communism was not a monolith, 
despite deeply-held American beliefs to the contrary that persisted for decades.  The fear 
and misunderstanding of Islamist movements that is prevalent among today’s national 
security professionals is reminiscent of this earlier era and requires a similar revelation. 
Because the concept of Islamism takes on so many forms—it is at once “an 
ideology, a movement-organization, and a form of government”5—its meaning is very 
difficult to understand.  Further compounding this challenge is the variance of methods 
that the various Islamist groups use to achieve their goals, which range from peaceful 
political activism to unabashed violence.  This complex problem has led many security 
professionals to adopt an orientalist-like eagerness to generalize every appearance of 
Islamism as a manifestation of radical ideology that poses a threat to national security in 
                                                 
4 National Military Strategy of the United States of America, Joint Chiefs of Staff Library, U.S. 
Department of Defense, February 8, 2011, http://www.jcs.mil//content/files/2011-
02/020811084800_2011_nms_-_08_feb_2011.pdf, 2–4. 
5 Mehdi Mozaffari, “What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept,” Totalitarian Movements 
and Political Religions 8, no. 1 (March 2007): 17–18, 27, 
https://pure.au.dk/portal/files/22326292/What_is_Islamism_Totalitarian_Movements_article.pdf. 
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some way.6  Breaking this trend of oversimplification is of paramount importance to 
developing an effective understanding of the variance between different Islamist 
movements.  This study focuses on one such movement, contemporary Salafism, in an 
effort to better understand its history, motivations, and objectives.  Since contemporary 
Salafists assign a fundamental importance to the formative period of Islam, which 
includes the Rightly Guided Caliphate, a detailed study of this period and the Salafists’ 
interpretation of provides these insights.  A better understanding of contemporary 
Salafism can enable greater effectiveness when dealing with both political and violent 
Salafist and Salafism-inspired organizations.    
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
As mentioned earlier, the major problem addressed by this study is characterized 
by a two-part research question: why do contemporary Salafists view the formative 
period of Islam, including the Rightly Guided Caliphate, as an ideal worth emulating, and 
what was the reality of the Rightly Guided Caliphate?  The nature of the problem requires 
the research question to be dissected into two parts because an effective analysis of what 
the Rightly Guided Caliphate means to contemporary Salafists first requires a 
dispassionate explanation of its true nature.  Addressing a number of foundational 
questions helps answer this study’s research question. 
The best way to approach the question about the true nature of the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate is to analyze the reigns of each of its four caliphs to determine the composition, 
function, and evolution of the caliphate during the period.  This requires an understanding 
of the subjects the caliphate governed, the challenges each caliph faced, the methods used 
to overcome those challenges and maintain governance, and the ways in which the 
caliphate changed during the period.  Of special interest are the circumstances 
surrounding the reign of the fourth caliph, Ali ibn Abi Talib, as it was during this period 
that the conflict between the Prophet’s companions intensified, eventually leading to 
                                                 
6 Ibid.; Ayoob, Political Islam, 1; Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western 
Eyes (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 54; Meghana Nayak and Christopher Malone, 
“American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism: A Critical Rethinking of US Hegemony,” 
International Studies Review 11, no. 2 (2009), 253–54, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-
2486.2009.000848.x/pdf.  
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Ali’s death.  This laid the foundation for the subsequent—and ultimately enduring—rift 
between Sunni and Shi’a.  Since many contemporary Salafists deride Shi’ism as both an 
aberration and threat to Islam, an understanding of the circumstances surrounding Ali’s 
reign is especially important to this study.7  To best understand the reality of the Rightly 
Guided Caliphate period, three themes are examined in detail.  The first is that the 
Rightly Guided Caliphs faced significant challenges in defining their roles and 
responsibilities and adapting them to meet the challenges of the times.  The second is that 
they maintained control over elite factions within Mecca and Medina and the restive Arab 
tribal groups that formed the core of its state posed another major challenge.  Finally, the 
third theme is the caliphs’ strategy of mitigating the restiveness of these groups by 
channeling their energies into conquests that eventually created larger challenges which 
stretched the ability of the caliphs to wield both political and religious authority.  These 
themes underscore this study’s first major hypothesis: the tremendous turmoil that 
marked the Rightly Guided Caliphate period was a function of the political challenges 
each caliph faced, and the nature of these challenges drove them to respond in ways that 
do not appear to be consistent with the actions and teachings of the Prophet. 
By establishing the first three generations of Islam as the definitive model for 
Muslims to emulate (the end of which is typically marked by the death of Ahmad ibn 
Hanbal in 855), contemporary Salafists reject the interpretation of theological schools 
that followed this period and oppose the “blind following of the four canonical law 
schools [emphasis added]”8 as well.9  Given the chaotic nature of the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate, the behavior of its four caliphs, and the grandeur of the Golden Age of Islam 
that occurred several centuries later, the Rightly Guided Caliphate period appears to be an 
                                                 
7 Guido Steinberg, “Jihadi Salafism and the Shi’is: Remarks about the Intellectual Roots of anti-
Shi’ism,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009), 107–8, 114–15; Christopher Blanchard, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving 
Ideology (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 8. 
8 Roel Meijer, Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2009), 4.  
9 Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s New 
Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (33–57) (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 38–39; Adis 
Duderija, “Islamic Groups and their World-views and Identities: Neo-Traditional Salafis and Progressive 
Muslims,” Arab Law Quarterly 21, no. 4 (2007), 350–52, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27650599. 
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illogical one to emulate.  This apparent paradox makes an analysis of the contemporary 
Salafist narrative of the period so important.  To achieve this, three aspects of the 
narrative are studied.  First, the narrative’s treatment of the beliefs and actions of the 
Rightly Guided Caliphs and other leaders during the period, particularly the positive 
ones, are analyzed.  Second, the question of whether the narrative acknowledges any 
misdeeds of the companions is addressed, and if misdeeds are indeed acknowledged, their 
explanations are studied.  Third, the overall contemporary Salafist perception of the unity 
of the community of believers (or umma) during the Rightly Guided Caliphate period is 
examined.  The answers to these essential questions underscore this study’s second major 
hypothesis: contemporary Salafists ignore the negative aspects of the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate because they are prejudiced by a desire to reinvent the period in a way that 
better supports their religious and political objectives.  
C. SOURCES THAT INFORM THIS STUDY’S RESEARCH 
The two-part nature of this study’s research question requires an analysis of two 
distinct perspectives of the Rightly Guided Caliphate period: the traditional historical 
viewpoint and the contemporary Salafist narrative.  To capture the traditional historical 
perspective of the period, this study examines the arguments posed by prominent early 
Islamic historians M. A. Shaban, Hugh Kennedy, J. J. Saunders, and Patricia Crone.  To 
understand the context of the contemporary Salafist narrative, the history, doctrine, and 
organization of the movement is derived from the works of John Esposito and Quintan 
Wiktorowicz.  Finally, the actual substance of the narrative is examined through a survey 
of the writings of several prominent Salafi leaders from the purist, political activist, and 
jihadi camps, including Mohammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, Aziz bin Baz, Safar al-Hawali, 
Osama bin Laden, and Ayman al-Zawahiri.   
1. History of the Rightly Guided Caliphate 
In Islamic History A.D. 600-750 (A.H. 132): A New Interpretation, M. A. Shaban 
recounted that the four rulers of the Rightly Guided Caliphate faced a number of 
significant challenges, which elicited various responses and influenced the true nature of 
the period.  The first challenge discussed by the author was the fundamental problem of 
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defining and redefining the actual role and responsibilities of the post of caliph.  Shaban 
recounted how Abu Bakr transformed the post from a part time position to one with 
modest political and religious power; how Umar ibn al-Kattab, recognizing that the limits 
to caliphal power made effective governance challenging, may have considered 
abolishing the post; how accusations that Uthman ibn Affan usurped too much authority 
helped bring about his assassination; and how Ali ibn Abi Talib’s interpretation of 
caliphal powers served as a pretext for his enemies to attack him.10  The second caliphal 
challenge Shaban described was the importance of maintaining harmony among the 
prominent factions of the state’s core—namely the families of Mecca and Medina—on 
the issues of political power and financial wealth distribution.11  The author reported how 
each caliph’s assumption and retention of power was affected by his ability to overcome 
this set of problems.  The third challenge discussed by Shaban involved the restiveness of 
the Bedouin Arab tribes.  He recounted how each caliph’s ability to deal with this factor 
led to the reunification of the state after an early secession crisis; fueled the conquests 
that expanded the state into Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Iran; and provided a measure of 
security against external invasion along the state’s periphery.12 
In The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We 
Live In, Hugh Kennedy discussed how the early caliphate escaped a near collapse, arose 
from the ashes of a broken confederation, and transformed into an empire encompassing 
most of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and the Arabian Peninsula by the end of the fourth 
caliph’s rule.  Of particular relevance to this study is Kennedy’s emphasis on the fragility 
of the new state and discussion of how Abu Bakr’s efforts to subdue the seceding tribes 
after Mohammad’s death defined the nature of the caliph’s dual political and religious 
leadership role.  To explain the fragility of the state, Kennedy described how the problem 
of succession after Mohammad’s death almost resulted in the state’s collapse.  He 
asserted that Mohammad’s failure to name a successor required that his companions not 
only make a politically-charged decision about who the new leader would be, but also 
                                                 
10 M. A. Shaban, Islamic History, A.D. 600-750 (A.H. 132): A New Interpretation (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1971), 19, 56, 60, 70–71, 73, 77. 
11 Ibid., 18, 62, 66-67, 70–74.  
12 Ibid., 23–26, 28, 66–67, 74.  
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that they must define his role, since Mohammad had been very clear that he was the last 
(or seal) of the Prophets.13  Through what the author termed a “coup d’état,”14  Umar’s 
support of Abu Bakr as the Prophet’s successor at once mitigated a factional dispute 
between Medina and the prominent Meccan Quraysh tribe and solidified the idea that 
there would be only one leader—with both religious and political power—of the young 
Muslim state.15  Second, Kennedy’s account of how Abu Bakr subdued those peripheral 
Arab Bedouin tribes that had seceded following the death of the Prophet (while indicating 
their willingness to continue to practice Islam) described a further strengthening of the 
caliph’s position and definition of the community as belonging solely to his state.16 
J. J. Saunders’s A History of Medieval Islam is of significant value to this study as 
it provides a greater amount of detail, largely through anecdotes, about the personal 
qualities of each of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs than is found in the two previously 
discussed sources.  Regarding Abu Bakr, the author highlighted several points.  He 
discussed the lenience with which the first caliph treated the Bedouin separatists after 
they were reintegrated into the fledgling state, the restraint he exhibited by admonishing 
his Islamic fighters not to harm defenseless people who capitulated in battle, the wisdom 
he exhibited in choosing a successor when he died, and his gentle but firm character that 
preserved and strengthened the state.17      
Umar was described by Saunders as a humble man who, without the benefit of 
belonging to an elite family or owning the reputation of military prowess, was able to 
make “his mark by sheer force of will, shrewd judgment of men and motives, and 
political acumen.”18  The author recounted that under Umar’s reign, the caliphate 
assumed a more secular and military character.19  In addition to these positive notes, 
                                                 
13 Hugh Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live 
In (London: Orion Publishing, 2007), 54–55. 
14 Ibid., 54. 
15 Ibid., 54–55.  
16 Ibid., 55–57, 63. 
17 J. J. Saunders, A History of Medieval Islam (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), 43–44. 
18 Ibid., 45, 47, 57. 
19 Ibid., 45. 
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however, the author levied criticism of Umar’s decision to destroy, rather than defeat, the 
Sassanids, which only further escalated the level of animosity between the two 
civilizations.20   
About Uthman, Saunders’s description was rather unforgiving.  He recounted that 
Uthman was a deeply pious man, but observed that he was, at best, an incompetent and 
unwise ruler and at worst, a significantly corrupt and nepotistic one.21  Saunders 
discussed how Uthman’s appointment of family members to important posts, 
mismanagement of the state’s finances, and decision to standardize the Qur’an in a single 
version caused him to lose support from most of his constituents, including some of the 
Prophet’s closest companions. 22  This lack of support eventually contributed to Uthman’s 
assassination.23  The last Rightly Guided Caliph, Ali, was described by the author as 
exceptionally pious, morally upstanding, and fiercely loyal, but also as the subject of 
ridicule for his heavy weight and uncomely countenance.24  Saunders recounted how Ali 
appeared extremely indecisive and unstatesmanlike through his inaction against the 
murderers of his predecessor and his loss of control of his coalition after being challenged 
by Mu’awiya ibn Abi Sufyan for leadership of the Islamic state.25   
Patricia Crone, in God’s Rule—Government and Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval 
Islamic Political Thought, placed heavy emphasized on the religious aspect of the Rightly 
Guided Caliphs’ power with three main points.  First, like Shaban and Kennedy, Crone 
recounted how Abu Bakr inherited the reigns of the Islamic state without the status of 
prophethood and with little guidance for what his role should be, so he defined it.26  She 
noted that Abu Bakr eventually selected the title caliph (or deputy) to reflect his 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 56. 
21 Ibid., 61-63. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 67. 
25 Ibid., 63–64.  
26 Patricia Crone, God’s Rule—Government and Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political 
Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 18. 
 9 
subservience to God and the Prophet.27  Second, the author explained that possessing 
good religious leadership was of critical importance to the Muslim community because 
Mohammad had taught them that being devoid of such leadership was akin to not being 
saved.  For the early community of believers, having a caliph was necessary not only for 
religious leadership but for salvation, and the controversy over whether Ali or Mu’awiya 
was the rightful caliph presented a dilemma for all Muslims as they feared a wrong 
choice could have consequences in the afterlife.28  Crone’s third point underscoring the 
importance of religion within the caliphate was the early Muslims’ belief that good 
governance was epitomized by the use of force and violence in a manner that was 
justifiable by God.29 
The study of these important historical sources finds two key themes that 
persisted during the Rightly Guided Caliphate period.  First, while religious unity was 
prevalent throughout the time, the political unity of the caliphate was perpetually 
threatened by factionalism and self-interest, as manifested in the numerous disputes 
between companions that sometimes erupted in violence.  Second, to adequately deal 
with the challenge of governing the burgeoning empire, the caliphs were faced with the 
necessity of exerting a greater amount of political (and sometimes religious) control.  
These efforts were resisted on numerous levels, creating even more discord between its 
various factions.   
2. The Contemporary Salafist Narrative 
To understand the roots, doctrine, and composition of the contemporary Salafist 
movement, this study examines John Esposito’s Islam: The Straight Path.  Though 
fundamentally different in many ways, contemporary Salafists trace their history back to 
the emergence of the modern Salafist movement in the late 1800s.  Esposito explained 
how the earlier movement sought to reverse the perceived decline of Islamic society 
relative to the West through reform and purification.  Its earliest leaders, Jamal al-Din al-
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 20–21.  
29 Ibid., 8, 318–20.  
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Afghani and Mohammad Abduh, advocated a reinterpretation of key aspects of Islam that 
would enable it to regain its relevance in the modern world.  Esposito explained that 
while al-Afghani and Abduh believed the core principles of Islam were unchangeable, the 
method by which those principles were employed needed to be reexamined—including 
the abandonment of the tradition aversion to the use of reason.  Esposito also explained 
how the movement changed into a form more reminiscent of today’s contemporary 
Salafists under the direction of Rashid Rida.  Rida was highly skeptical of Western 
influence and believed that Islam could solve the world’s problems without the 
reinterpretation advocated by his predecessors.  He also feared that the use of reason and 
other Western practices would lead to a secularization of Islam that would undermine it 
from within.  These leaders are significant today because most contemporary Salafists 
embrace Rida’s beliefs, while holding onto al-Afghani and Abduh’s reverence for the 
core principles of Islam and desire to purify society.30 
Though the contemporary Salafist movement is extremely diverse and consists of 
many different groups with different ambitions, each of these groups share a common 
creed.  Quintan Wiktorowicz discussed both the movement’s creed and its internal 
factions at length in his “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement.”  He described the various 
Salafi groups as belonging to one of three different categories based on their respective 
understandings of contemporary problems and interpretations of how to best apply Islam 
to these problems. 31  These include the “purists,” who emphasize nonviolent means such 
as example and education to purify society; the “politicos,” who engage in politics to 
bring the tenets of Salafism to society; and “jihadis,” who use violence to impose this 
creed on others.32  Despite their differences in methods, the author argued that each 
group shares the same religious creed (or aqida), which centers upon the belief in the 
oneness (or tawhid) of God.33  He explained that tawhid entails an acceptance that there 
                                                 
30 Esposito, Islam, 154–58, 160.  






is only one God, Allah; that God is unique and does not share power with any aspect of 
his creation; and that only God is worthy of worship.34  Wiktorowicz added that 
Contemporary Salafists not only share a belief in these principles, but agree that a strict 
adherence to the Qur’an and the Sunna (as observed by the companions of the Prophet) is 
necessary to avoid straying from the true path of Islam through actions called innovations 
(or bid’a).35  According to the author, this places a tremendous importance on the hadith, 
“perhaps even more important to Salafis than the Qur’an itself,” because of the difficulty 
of applying the rather ambiguous passages of the Qur’an to modern problems.36  Since 
the hadiths are composed of the observations of those closest to the Prophet, the 
companions represent a tremendously important link to Mohammad for contemporary 
Salafists of all stripes. 
The actual substance of the contemporary Salafist narrative was derived from the 
works of several of the movement’s most prominent leaders.  To understand the purist 
Salafist perspective, this study examines the writings of Mohammad Nasiruddin al-
Albani and Aziz bin Baz.  In “The Hadith is Proof Itself in Belief and Laws,” al-Albani 
reinforced the importance of the first generation of Muslims (the Salaf) as observers of 
the Prophet’s life and actions, explained that the hadith is equal in value to the Qur’an 
because God’s word cannot be properly understood without the Prophet’s interpretation, 
and discussed the zealous manner in which the companions protected the sanctity of the 
Sunna.37  In “The Sacred Salafee Methodology,” he discussed many topics of relevance 
to this study including the strong unity of the umma, the companions’ concurrence on the 
fundamentals of Islam, the necessity of following the actions of the Prophet and his 
companions for salvation, Mohammad’s prediction that the umma would split, and the 
deviance of the Kharijites.38  In “Fataawaa of Shaikh Al-Albaanee (Rahimahullaah),” he 
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further reinforced the devotion and purity of the Salaf and described how they, as a 
whole, were infallible, but as individuals were not.39   
Three selections from bin Baz provide insight into the contemporary Salafist 
perspective on the Rightly Guided Caliphate period.  In “Knowledge,” he discussed the 
importance of the companions as being the most knowledgeable and authentic in 
religious practice of any Muslim generation due to their nearness to the Prophet and their 
devotion to the Qur’an and Sunna.40  He also recounted that the companions had 
disagreements but those disagreements did not contradict their devotion to God and to the 
way of life they learned from Mohammad.41  In “The Authentic Creed and the 
Invalidators of Islam,” he discussed how the companions are to be revered not only 
because the Prophet himself commanded it but also because they understood the true 
nature of God and did not innovate.42  He also discussed that the companions, unlike the 
Shi’a who later derided and blasphemed them, always tried to do what was right.43  In 
“The Advice of Shaykhul-Islaam Ibn Baaz (D. 1420H) to Usaamah Ibn Laadin Al-
Khaarijee,” he reinforced the dangers of intra-Muslim violence and rebellion against 
legitimate rulers by describing how the beloved companion Usama ibn Zaid disagreed 
with the caliph Uthman but did not openly disparage him and by discussing the damaging 
effects of the Kharijites, whom bin Baz blamed for the murder of Uthman and the 
subsequent conflict between Ali and Mu’awiyah.44 
The works of political activist Safar al-Hawali are surveyed to understand the 
nuances of the politico Salafist faction.  His work “When the Ummah Deviated from the 
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Actions of the Heart” is relevant to this study because its central theme was the nature of 
the companions, which he discussed at length.  In this treatise, he provides a portrait of 
the companions as being extremely knowledgeable, pure in their practice of Islam and 
treatment of others, tremendously devoted to God, and free of any intention to innovate.  
He explained that innovation was a practice that came after the first generation of 
Muslims and he admonished us to reject innovation and return to the pure practices 
observed by the companions. 45 
The writings of two well-known jihadists, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-
Zawahiri, were also surveyed to obtain an understanding of the jihadi Salafist 
perspective.  In James Gelvin’s article “Al-Qaeda and Anarchism: A Historian’s Reply to 
Terrorology,” bin Ladin’s discussion of the Rightly Guided Caliphate is recounted.  He 
stresses the unity that existed during the Rightly Guided Caliphate period and boasted 
that modern Muslims are becoming reunified—an occurrence that proves that the 
reestablishment of a new Rightly Guided Caliphate will happen soon.46  Al-Zawahiri’s 
lecture to the people of Tunisia in “Zawahiri Urges Tunisians Seek Shariah-Based 
Governance” is surveyed as well.  In it, he explains his views on the importance of 
adopting Sharia and the deviance of separating Islam from governance—and recounted 
that the Rightly Guided Caliphs themselves were willing to wage jihad protect the 
assimilation of Islam and government.47 
This collective survey of contemporary Salafist sources finds several major 
trends.  First, the authors explained that the first generation of Muslims were infallible as 
a group, but acknowledged the imperfection of the individuals who comprised it.  
Second, the unity of the umma during this period was described as exceptionally strong, 
even after deviant factions began to undermine it during Uthman’s tenure.  Third, the 
                                                 
45 Safar al-Hawali, “When the Ummah Deviated from the Actions of the Heart,” trans. Tarek 
Mehanna, July 17, 2008, http://iskandrani.wordpress.com/2008/07/17/when-the-ummah-deviated-from-the-
actions-of-the-heart/. 
46 James Gelvin, “Al-Qaeda and Anarchism: A Historian’s Reply to Terrorology,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 20, no. 4 (2008), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550802257291, 573–75. 




authors did not blame Ali for either his conflict with Mu’awiyah or the later formalization 
of the Shi’a sect, which contemporary Salafists consider deviant.  These trends are 
described in detail later in this study. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This study employs a combination of analytic approaches to answer the primary 
research question, including the historical, historiographical, and comparative study 
methods.  The historical study method is used to ascertain the reality of the Rightly 
Guided Caliphate.  As mentioned earlier, this involves an examination of its four caliphs, 
the subjects the caliphate was comprised of, the challenges it was faced with, the ways in 
which it dealt with those challenges and exercised power, and how it changed from one 
ruler to the next.  Special emphasis is placed on the circumstances surrounding the reign 
of the fourth caliph, Ali ibn Abi Talib, due to its role in forming the longstanding Sunni-
Shi’a rift.  Through historical study, the composition, function, and evolution of the 
caliphate are explained.    
Historiographical study is then used to examine the contemporary Salafist 
narrative regarding the tumultuous Rightly Guided Caliphate period.  This includes the 
movement’s account of the leaders within the caliphate, denial or acknowledgment of the 
misdeeds of the companions, and overall perception of the unity of the umma during this 
period.  These details provide a greater understanding of contemporary Salafists’ views 
of the Rightly Guided Caliphate.  
The final analytic approach this study uses is comparative study.  The traditional 
historical account of the Rightly Guided Caliphate is compared to the historiographical 
interpretation of the contemporary Salafist narrative of the period.  By examining the 
context of and comparing the two accounts, the answer to the most important aspect of 
this research—why the seemingly tumultuous Rightly Guided Caliphate period forms 
much of the historical basis for contemporary Salafists’ ideal re-grounding of the Islamic 
faith—is answered.  
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E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This master’s thesis is organized along a five-chapter construct.  Following this 
introductory chapter, the second chapter analyzes the traditional historical account of the 
Rightly Guided Caliphate.  It examines several major aspects of each caliph’s reign, 
including the subjects the caliphate was comprised of, the challenges it was faced with, 
the ways in which it dealt with those challenges and exercised power, and how it changed 
from one ruler to the next.   
The third chapter examines the contemporary Salafist movement and its narrative 
of the Rightly Guided Caliphate.  It begins by providing an overview of the movement’s 
roots, doctrine, and composition for context.  Then, it discusses the narrative’s account of 
the beliefs and actions of the early Muslim leaders, denial or acknowledgment of 
misdeeds, perception of the unity of the umma during this formative period, and 
perspective on the Sunni-Shi’a rift.   
The fourth chapter compares the traditional historical account with the 
contemporary Salafist narrative of the Rightly Guided Caliphate and offers an 
explanation for why contemporary Salafists hold the period in such high regard despite 
its tumultuous nature.  The thesis then concludes with a fifth chapter, which summarizes 
this study’s findings and offers policy recommendations. 
The major finding of this study is that the contemporary Salafist movement holds 
the Rightly Guided Caliphate in such high regard, despite the paradoxical turmoil and 
violence associated with it, because they consider it to be the summit of both spiritual 
purity and temporal power in Islamic history.  Contemporary Salafists, like their modern 
Salafist predecessors, long for a resurgence of Muslim power in the world, but do not 
want to sacrifice religious purity to obtain it.  The Rightly Guided Caliphate epitomizes 
this notion because its earliest generation was the most pure, in terms of the practice of 
Islam, of any Muslim generation, and its seemingly miraculous expansion signified 
enormous temporal power—relative to its competitors, who have since overtaken them—
that is easily romanticized.  The narrative omits much of the violence that occurred 
during the Rightly Guided Caliphate period to protect an idealized remembrance of the 
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state’s power, not its religious unity, and the problems that were acknowledged are done 
so in a manner that reinforces the importance of key aspects of contemporary Salafist 




II. THE REALITY OF THE RIGHTLY GUIDED CALIPHATE 
A. OVERVIEW 
Throughout the course of his life, the Prophet Mohammad accomplished many 
extraordinary feats.  He consolidated all of Arabia into a new order—one that 
transcended deep-seated, longstanding tribal loyalties—and organized it into a functional 
state with a common religion.  The binding power of the tribe was not replaced, but 
instead was subsumed by an institution with a supernatural purpose: the umma, or body 
of believers.  Grounded in the tenets of Islam (which Mohammad emphasized was not a 
new religion but rather the restoration of the principles of the prophets of old), the 
community he forged strove for peace through social justice and cooperation.  Therefore, 
the death of the Prophet in 632 became a watershed event in human history.  With the 
passing of “one of the most remarkable lives in the history of the world,”48 the fledgling 
Islamic state, and the religious principles it embodied, stood at a crossroads.49   
Although the sudden absence of the Prophet’s powerful leadership could have 
resulted in the demise of the fragile state and its new interpretation of an ancient religion, 
rather than falling apart, the state was strengthened and expanded during the tenure of 
Mohammad’s first four successors.  Each of these rulers had been companions of the 
Prophet, and they would later become known as the Rightly Guided Caliphs.  These men 
were Abu Bakr, who reigned from 632 to 634; Umar ibn al-Kattab, reigning from 634 to 
644; Uthman ibn Affan, reigning from 644 to 656; and Ali ibn Abi Talib, whose reign 
lasted from 656 to 661.  During the course of these four rulers’ successive regimes, the 
caliphate not only strengthened its power within the Arabian Peninsula, but underwent an 
enormous expansion as well, challenging the declining Byzantine and Sassanid Empires 
and extending its reach from Arabia into Egypt, the Caucasus, and modern-day 
Afghanistan.  Despite this seemingly miraculous success, the period was also marked by 
significant religious and political turmoil, highlighted by the assassination of three of the 
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four ruling caliphs, intense fighting amongst the Prophet’s companions, and the 
origination of the sectarian divide between Sunni and Shi’a.50 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a dispassionate account of the reality of 
the Rightly Guided Caliphate so that it may be used as a baseline against which the 
contemporary Salafist narrative can be compared.  The account that will be presented is 
informed by authoritative historical works, including the arguments posed by prominent 
early Islamic historians M.A. Shaban, Hugh Kennedy, J.J. Saunders, and Patricia Crone.  
This chapter will examine each of the four Rightly Guided Caliph’s reigns individually to 
explain the subjects who comprised the state, the challenges the state faced, the means 
with which the state dealt with those challenges, and how the state changed from one 
ruler to the next.  The results of these findings will validate or repudiate this study’s first 
major hypothesis: that the tremendous turmoil existent during the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate period was a function of the political challenges each caliph faced, and the 
nature of these challenges drove the caliphs to respond in ways that do not appear to be 
consistent with the actions and teachings of the Prophet.   
B. THE SUCCESSOR: ABU BAKR 
1. Composition of the State 
Though Mohammad did not name a successor before his death in 632, Abu Bakr 
was quickly selected by the Prophet’s companions to lead the young state.  The choice of 
Abu Bakr was prudent; he had been one of the Prophet’s closest friends, his father-in-
law, and had faced significant personal danger as one of the earliest converts to the 
Islamic faith.  Though neither a prophet nor a soldier, Abu Bakr was well-known and 
well-respected among his peers.  His selection as ruler would prove to be extremely 
advantageous, because his decisive—yet humble—leadership was well suited for the 
inimitable composition and character of the Muslim state he was entrusted with.  Two 
factors, in particular, made the state so unique: its ability to forge a bond between the 
political and religious spheres, making it both a state and a community of believers; and  
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its ability to not only contain the restiveness of the tribes who belonged to it, but to 
leverage their fighting spirit into the fuel for the enormous expansion that continued long 
after Abu Bakr’s reign was concluded.  
The first aspect of the early Islamic state Abu Bakr inherited that made it so 
unique was its simultaneous political and religious nature.  Mohammad united a vast 
number of tribes, each with a long history of fierce independence and predisposition to 
conflict, into a single state that ascribed to the tenets of Islam.  The umma comprised both 
a state and a community of believers, and in the words of Patricia Crone, its members 
were both “believers and citizens . . . ruled by the Prophet, [and] thereafter by his 
successors.”51  This condition did not change during Abu Bakr’s reign, despite the series 
of challenges that threatened it.  The unique political and religious nature of the early 
umma stood in stark contrast to the example of their early Christian contemporaries.  The 
Christian experience was one of separate, sometimes competing affiliations to their polity 
and religion.  The Roman Empire, ruled by Caesar, represented the former while the 
church, led by its clerics, represented the latter.  Much like the way the early Christian 
experience laid the foundation for a longstanding tradition of separation of church and 
state, the early umma’s combined political and religious nature provides modern Islamists 
with the historical example they wish to emulate.52 
The second important characteristic of Abu Bakr’s early Islamic state was the 
factional, independent, and restive nature of the tribes who comprised it.  Tribal 
factionalism and independence had long been a trait of Arab culture, and the Prophet’s 
death provided an opportunity for these two tendencies to reemerge in a way that almost 
destroyed the fragile state.53  While many tribes along the periphery of the state decided 
to revoke their allegiance, the fact that Mohammad’s loyal followers in Medina (the 
ansar) nearly chose the same course speaks volumes about the strength of tribal 
factionalism and the Arabs’ fierce independence.54  Restiveness was demonstrated by 
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those who rebelled against the state during Abu Bakr’s reign as well as those who chose 
to remain loyal to it, through the willingness of both sides to engage in armed conflict to 
pursue their goals.55 
2. Challenges Faced By the State 
Had it not been for the strong leadership of Abu Bakr, the death of the Prophet in 
632 could have easily hastened the collapse of the fledgling Islamic state.  As mentioned 
earlier, two separate—yet closely related—existential crises emerged to challenge the 
Islamic state and its umma: one of succession, and another of secession.  In many ways, 
the failure of the Prophet to name a successor helped fan the flames of the secession 
issue.  Both crises were confronted head on, and in the short two year reign of Abu Bakr, 
his decisive actions and shrewd governance not only enabled the fledgling Muslim polity 
to weather those crises, but paved the way for a tradition of expansion that would persist 
long after his own death in 643.  
While both of these major challenges emerged quickly in the days following the 
death of the Prophet, the crisis of succession was the most immediate issue that needed to 
be dealt with.  Mohammad’s failure to name a successor before his death created a major 
problem for his companions; if the young Islamic state was to survive, it would need a 
leader; many factions within the umma had already begun to consider their own specific 
needs, indicating that a fracturing of the state a distinct possibility.  Although the 
Prophet’s death came relatively quickly, his health had been failing for several months, 
and yet he still made no pronouncement about whom (if anyone) would succeed him.56  
Unfortunately, since Mohammad had neither a male heir nor a specified deputy, no clear 
candidate stood out.  Shaban stated that the Prophet most likely intended to defer the 
issue of succession to his companions as a result of these circumstances and “his deep 
understanding of his times.”57  Further associated with the problem of naming a 
successor was the question of what this new leader’s role would be.  Since Mohammad 
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had made it clear to his followers that he was the seal of the Prophets, the role that any 
potential successor would play—within both the political and religious spheres—was 
open to a great amount of interpretation.58     
The second major crisis that challenged the fledgling Islamic state shortly after 
the Prophet’s death was the issue of secession.  Factions from both the core and the 
periphery of the state began to reevaluate their positions and willingness to remain within 
it.  Inside the very heart of the state, though they never considered abandoning Islam as a 
religion, the ansar of Medina began to reconsider their willingness to share power with 
Mohammad’s Quraysh tribe.  Many members of the Quraysh were quickly gaining 
influence within the state, despite their recent history of persecuting the earliest Muslims 
and warring with the Medinans before their conversion to Islam.59  From the periphery of 
the state, the allegiance of those tribes was even more problematic.  Though warfare was 
certainly an important and effective method of state expansion and preservation for the 
Prophet, Kennedy argued that Mohammad’s reputation and masterful use of diplomacy 
were the largest factors in the peripheral tribes’ (such as those in Yemen and Oman) 
willingness to  accept Islam and join with the new state.60  For many of those tribes, their 
sense of pride and fierce independent spirit were bruised by this subservience to 
Mohammad and the core of the state.61  Therefore, when Mohammad died, many of them 
seceded on the grounds that their allegiance had been given to Mohammad, the man, not 
to the state itself.62  With the Prophet’s vast influence gone, swift and decisive action was 
necessary to hold the state together. 
3. The Exercise of Power 
The first series of problems associated with succession were settled in dramatic 
fashion.  With the dissolution of the fragile state almost imminent, Mohammad’s 
companion (and future caliph) Umar ibn al-Kattab acted shrewdly to deal with the 
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problem of choosing a successor.  Through a move that Kennedy termed a “coup d’état,” 
Umar swore his allegiance to Abu Bakr in the presence of Quraysh and ansar leaders, 
engendering a sense of obligation within both sides and prompting each to follow suit.63  
This clever political move brought resolution to several immediate questions associated 
with the selection of a successor.  First and foremost, it ensured that there would indeed 
be a successor to Mohammad, Abu Bakr, and that he would exercise both political and 
religious power.  Second, it settled one of the most pressing factional disputes by 
establishing that the new leader, a Qurayshite himself, would rule both Quraysh and 
ansar.  Third, it ensured that the leadership of the state would remain in the hands of the 
Prophet’s companions.  Fourth, it delineated that while Mecca would remain the religious 
center of the state, political power would continue to be based in Medina.64  With the 
leadership of the young state securely in Abu Bakr’s hands, the question of role definition 
could be addressed. 
While Abu Bakr was thrust into a position of political and religious responsibility, 
the nature of his selection and his non-prophet status severely limited his authority at a 
time when the existence of the state was still challenged by secession.   Initially, Abu 
Bakr exercised his minimal power in a very humble and subdued manner.65  Out of 
deference to the Prophet and unwillingness to tie his post to a specific set of 
responsibilities, he assumed the title Kalifat rasul-Allah, or successor to the Prophet of 
Allah—a title later shortened to caliph.66  This title possessed a measure of ambiguity 
that would give Abu Bakr time to determine his responsibilities and define his position.67  
Additionally, his service as caliph was only a part-time endeavor at first; he continued to 
support his family through merchant work and milking sheep until the umma decided that 
a full-time caliph was necessary.68  To preserve the Qur’an and Sunna, Abu Bakr 
appointed Zaid ibn Thabit, a renowned scholar, to begin the task of collecting the 
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Prophet’s teachings.69  Over time, Abu Bakr’s humility, careful adherence to the 
guidance of the Qur’an and Sunna, and success in dealing with the secession problem 
granted him the legitimacy necessary to assume modest political and religious power.70 
The Islamic state’s second major crisis, the secession of many of its peripheral 
tribes, was confronted in a decisive manner.  Abu Bakr and the other leaders of the state 
quickly decided that they would not permit secession; they resolved that anyone who 
pledged allegiance to the Prophet must transfer it to the caliphate’s new leadership and 
continue to render tribute payments or else they would lose their status as Muslims.71  To 
preserve both the state and the future of Islam, Abu Bakr directed his new general, Khalid 
ibn al-Walid, to execute a series of decisive military actions to subdue disloyal tribes and 
force them back into the state.72  These Wars of Apostasy were concluded within a year, 
resolving the secession crisis.  The rapid mobilization of a zealous army of believers also 
formed the foundation for future campaigns: recognizing the value in harnessing the 
restive nature and warlike spirit of the loyal Bedouin tribes for the benefit of the state, 
Abu Bakr turned his attention, and Khalid’s forces, towards Byzantine Syria.73  Khalid 
was tasked with conducting a series of raids and probing actions outside of Arabia that 
eventually culminated in the sound defeat of a Byzantine army near Damascus shortly 
before Abu Bakr’s death in 634.74   
4. Evolution of the State under Abu Bakr 
Though it only lasted two years, Abu Bakr’s reign proved to be a tremendous 
boon for both his state and the religion of Islam.  At the beginning of his tenure, the very 
existence of both was threatened.  The crisis of succession, which was brought about by 
Mohammad’s failure to appoint a successor and the absence of a clear candidate, left the 
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political and religious leadership of the umma in question.  The selection of Abu Bakr, 
and his subsequent commitment to following the guidance of the Qur’an and Sunna, 
provided the basis for continued political and religious leadership under one ruler that 
became the hallmark of the Rightly Guided Caliphate.  Similarly, Abu Bakr’s resolve in 
bringing the apostate tribes—and their tribute payments—back to the state ensured the 
preservation of both the state and its religion.  As the state’s government, religion, 
sources of funding, and social order were restored and strengthened, Abu Bakr 
masterfully turned this momentum outward, directing his military to conduct campaigns 
beyond Arabia and into Iraq and Syria.  These military actions led to additional sources 
of revenue, promulgated the spread of Islam, and sent a message to the Byzantines and 
Sassanids that a rival power was on the rise.  At the time of his death in 634, a united, 
Islamic Arabia was ready to challenge the world.75 
C. UMAR AND THE BIRTH OF AN EMPIRE 
1. Composition the State 
Fortunately for the Islamic state, there was no succession crisis after Abu Bakr’s 
death.  The first caliph broke with the precedence set by Mohammad and recommended 
to the other companions that Umar ibn al-Kattab should replace him after his death.76  
Umar, the man whose support of Abu Bakr during that earlier crisis of succession had 
essentially preserved the caliphate, took the reins without controversy or dispute in 634.77  
Before his selection as the new caliph, Umar had risen to prominence within the state 
without the benefit of belonging to an elite family or holding a reputation for military 
prowess.78  Instead, the success of his career up to that point was owed more to his 
political shrewdness, excellent judgment of character, loyalty, and ability to provide 
sound counsel to his seniors.79  The caliphate he inherited was newly reunified, protected 
by a zealous military, and poised for expansion.  Incorporated within its borders was the 
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entirety of the Arabian Peninsula, and to its north and east were the exposed flanks of the 
Byzantine and Sassanid Empires.80  As it did for Abu Bakr, one distinct feature of 
Arabian society of the time would prove extremely important during Umar’s tenure: the 
factional and restive nature of its tribes.  This was particularly so for the recently 
reconquered apostate tribes.  Although Abu Bakr had brought the apostates back into the 
state, he retained his suspicions and barred them from full participation in the activities of 
the umma—including military service.81  This resulted in a significant amount of 
“frustrated energies”82 that could have created serious problems for Umar. 
2. Challenges Faced By the State 
In comparison to the existential crises Abu Bakr was forced to deal with, the 
problems that Umar was confronted with could be described as good problems, since the 
latter mostly resulted from success.  This does not mean, however, that Umar’s problems 
were less complex.  For Umar, these challenges came in two waves:  the first set included 
those he inherited upon ascending to the position of caliph, and the second set developed 
as a result of the rapid expansion of the Islamic state. 
At the beginning of Umar’s tenure, two major problems existed.  The first of these 
was associated with the “frustrated energies”83 of the former apostate tribes that was 
mentioned above.  Although the caliphate was firmly united, the rebellious tribes whose 
reentry had to be forced were not forgiven quickly.  Abu Bakr’s policy restricted those 
apostates from participating in the caliphal military campaigns against the Byzantines and 
Sassanids that accelerated as the Wars of Apostasy wound down.  For those former 
rebels, the resultant loss of opportunity, affront to their honor, and unequal treatment 
could have fermented and eventually led to more rebellion.  Umar’s second immediate 
problem was the growth of tensions between the caliphate and its Byzantine and Sassanid 
neighbors.  As a result of their clashes with the increasingly powerful Islamic armies, 
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both empires quickly mobilized additional forces to counter the rise of the caliphate.84  
Escalation of conflict was all but inevitable.85  
As the caliphate went on to achieve a stream of victories against its imperial 
neighbors, the Islamic state’s enormous success created a new series of problems for 
Umar to contend with.  As vast territory from Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and Persia was 
incorporated into the growing caliphate, the monumental problem of governing these new 
subjects emerged.86  The ends and means associated with the treatment, protection, 
taxation, organization, and administration of these conquered territories had to be 
selected and established in a way that benefited the Islamic state.87  Complicating these 
policy challenges was another issue, one that pertained to the post of the caliph itself.  
Throughout the course of the young state’s rapid expansion, Umar recognized that the 
limited powers entrusted to his post ill-equipped the caliph to govern his budding 
empire.88  The successful military campaigns that expanded the boundaries of Islam were 
only partially directed by the caliph himself, and only through force of will, savvy 
political maneuvering, and physical presence at certain decisive points was Umar able to 
establish a sufficient measure of control over the processes for incorporating the newly 
conquered territories into the state.89  The ways in which Umar confronted these 
problems would have repercussions for the future of the caliphate. 
3. The Exercise of Power 
Though the actual powers of his post were significantly limited, Umar made the 
most of them by acting decisively in the instances he could.  Faced with the immediate 
problems of growing internal tension from the newly reconquered apostate tribes and the 
external Byzantine and Sassanid threats, Umar’s first act as caliph was a brilliant move: 
he vigorously overturned his predecessor’s policy of excluding the former apostate tribes 
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from military campaigning by encouraging their active participation.90  This decision 
simultaneously achieved the total reunification of umma, refocused the restive energies of 
the Bedouin tribes in a way that would benefit—rather than harm—the state, and 
generated the additional combat power necessary to counter the Byzantine and Sassanid 
mobilizations.91  These new warriors were quickly integrated into the powerful Islamic 
military.  
Over the course of Umar’s reign, the newly strengthened Muslim army pressed its 
neighbors on three fronts: the north, west, and east.  The northern campaign succeeded in 
taking Damascus by 636, Jerusalem by 638, and the entirety of Byzantine Syria by 639.  
To the west, Muslim forces met little resistance as they descended upon Byzantine Egypt 
with 3,000 cavalry in 639; by 640, all of Egypt was easily under Muslim control.  To the 
east, Muslim forces systematically conquered a disintegrating Sassanid Empire.  In 637, 
Qadisiyah was taken in a battle that saw the destruction of the bulk of Persian forces.  
This victory was followed by the capture of Ctesiphon on the Tigris River, then all of 
Iraq, and by 651, Persia was fully incorporated when the last Sassanid king, Yazdajird, 
was killed—as a fugitive.92   
To effectively govern these newly conquered territories, Umar implemented 
several important policies.  First, with a profound appreciation for how important the 
loyalty of these new subjects to the caliphate would be, Umar ordered the favorable 
treatment of the Syrians, Egyptians, and Iraqis.  The abuses those provinces suffered at 
the hands of their former Byzantine and Sassanid masters not only made them easier to 
conquer, but much easier to govern as well—and Umar exploited that condition.93  In 
exchange for their payment of tribute, Christians and Jews retained their religious 
freedoms, and local governments were retained and incorporated within the caliphate.94  
The Islamic forces that conquered those territories were forbidden from seizing land and 
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were mostly confined to outposts that kept them away from the local populace; this 
ensured minimal interruption of the lives and business of the new territory—as well as 
the flow of taxes to Medina.95  Instead of allowing the conquering soldiers to collect 
booty, they were given stipends from the caliphal treasury.96  Umar’s second major 
policy, which pertained to the treatment of Persia, was much different.  Since Umar 
viewed the Sassanids as a profound threat to the security of the caliphate, he made the 
fateful decision to “annihilate, rather than defeat” them.97  Although the Persians adopted 
Islam, they were far less willing to integrate into the caliphate politically and defiantly 
retained their language and culture.98  The Persians’ harsh treatment at the hands of their 
Arab conquerors enraged them.  This harsh treatment set the conditions for an act of 
vengeance; among the thousands of Persians that were enslaved and humiliated, one of 
them succeeded in assassinating Umar as he led a worship service in Medina in 644.99 
The last major challenge that Umar confronted was the limitations of his own 
power as caliph.  The best evidence of Umar’s acceptance of this condition can be found 
in his decision to adopt the title of amir al-mu’minin.  Although historians have 
interpreted the title’s meaning many different ways, Shaban makes a compelling 
argument that the selection of the word amir was meant in the context of “counselor,” 
and mu’minin in the context of “the inner circle of the Islamic community.”100  This 
interpretation indicates that Umar accepted two things about his role: that it was more 
political than religious in nature, and that his exercise of political authority was 
characterized more by advising and guiding than by forcing and directing.101  To 
overcome these limitations and ensure that effective policy was adopted during the course  
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and aftermath of the caliphal military campaigns, Umar made use of his political skill and 
forceful personality, as well as physically visited locations where a decision needed to be 
made or reinforced.102 
4. Evolution of the State under Umar 
During Umar’s reign, the caliphate experienced several significant changes that 
were either caused or effected by its tremendous success.   At the beginning of his tenure, 
though the Islamic state encompassed the entire Arabian Peninsula, a large portion of its 
tribes had been forcibly reintegrated into the caliphate and subsequently denied the ability 
to participate in the lucrative military campaigns that were gaining steam against the 
Byzantines and Sassanids.  This stoked underlying tensions that could have erupted into 
significant problems for the caliphate.  From a governance standpoint, the scope of the 
challenges in administering the caliphate was relatively small.  Externally, the caliphate’s 
military successes against its two powerful neighbors led to increased tensions that could 
have resulted in the eventual defeat of the Islamic state.  By the end of his reign, Umar’s 
masterful performance affected numerous changes.  He regained the loyalty of the former 
apostate tribes; transformed his state into an empire by conquering Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and 
Persia; established processes for administering, taxing, and protecting its newly 
incorporated provinces; and recast the post of caliph into one with a more secular 
character.  While Umar’s extraordinary vision and leadership enabled the remarkable 
expansion and reorganization of the caliphate that occurred during his tenure, his 
successor would not enjoy the same measure of success.103 
D. BOILING TENSIONS AND THE TUMULTUOUS REIGN OF UTHMAN 
1. Composition of the State 
Umar’s shocking assassination in 644 marked the turning of an era for the Rightly 
Guided Caliphate.  Under his tenure, the caliphate had enjoyed a period of unity, 
prosperity, and expansion, but conditions were emerging that would evolve into problems 
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his successor would be ill-equipped to deal with.  Like the Prophet before him, Umar 
decided against recommending a successor.  Before succumbing to his fatal wounds, he 
designated a six-member council from the most prominent companions of Mohammad to 
select the next caliph.  The most feasible candidates were Ali ibn Abi Talib, 
Mohammad’s cousin and son-in-law, and Uthman ibn Affan, who hailed from the 
affluent Umayyad family and was himself married to two of the Prophet’s daughters.  As 
one of the earliest converts to Islam and the first to come from a wealthy family, Uthman 
was well-loved by the Prophet.  He was known to be extremely pious, generous, and 
fiercely devoted to Islam.  He was also closely aligned with the Meccan elites who 
formed a significant portion of the state’s power base.  Ali was reportedly offered the 
post first, so long as he agreed to govern with subdued power like his predecessors had 
done.  Ali’s refusal to take the reins without increased political and religious authority 
prompted the council to nominate Uthman, who accepted both the post and the council’s 
conditions.  Thus began the 12 year reign of the embattled third caliph.104 
In a major sense, the passing of Umar can be seen as a point of momentum 
change.  Prior to his death in 644, expansion occurred at a rapid pace; afterwards, though 
the caliphate did go on to enjoy a number of military triumphs, its territorial growth 
would slow significantly.105  By the time Uthman assumed the mantle of leadership for 
the burgeoning caliphate, the Muslim empire spanned from Egypt, to Syria, to the 
Arabian Peninsula; had defeated the Sassanid Empire; and was on the march across 
Persia.  The third caliph inherited a vast empire and exceptionally capable military.  
Unfortunately, he also inherited two major conditions that challenged his rule and 
eventually contributed to his own brutal assassination: growing tensions between the core 
and periphery of the Islamic empire, and lack of support for the expansion of caliphal 
authority to meet those and other emerging problems.106  These conditions and their 
resultant challenges will be discussed in detail below. 
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2. Challenges Faced By the State 
The first major condition that underpinned many of the problems Uthman faced 
during his tenure was the divergence of political and economic interests between the core 
and periphery of the state.  The astounding pace of expansion that the caliphate 
experienced resulted in three noteworthy effects: it generated a tremendous amount of 
wealth; spurred the migration of Arabs from the interior of the empire to the new 
provinces forming in Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Persia; and invited retribution from the 
Byzantine Empire.107  For Meccans and Medinans, who had been the earliest members 
and who represented the traditional power base of the caliphate, the political and 
economic empowerment of the empire’s burgeoning periphery was viewed as a threat to 
their interests.108  Within the periphery, those who had sacrificed to expand the 
caliphate’s borders and who stood ready to defend them against Byzantine aggression 
developed a strong sense of independence and began to take enormous pride in the 
regions within which  they now lived.109  These tribesmen began to demand their share of 
the spoils of war and looked at the core’s efforts to retain control of the provinces, and 
their resources, with suspicion.110 
Two of the most prominent challenges Uthman was faced with that resulted from 
these tensions took place in the Kufa Province of Iraq and Egypt.  The Kufa case began 
as a conflict over land rights.  Instead of dividing up the most lucrative Sassanid 
properties captured in the province, special Kufan administrators (known as the qurra) 
took the liberty to retain them and distribute the profits among the warriors who had 
helped liberate them.111  Uthman’s attempt to establish caliphal administrative control 
over the qurra’s system angered them and triggered a series of events that led to the 
Kufans’ defiant expulsion of the caliph’s appointed governor, Said ibn al-As, and 
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replacement with their own candidate, Abu Musa al-Ashari.112  Within Egypt, it was the 
conflict over the distribution of war spoils that challenged the caliph.   To encourage 
greater participation in his campaigns across North Africa and more effectively defend 
against the Byzantine threat, Uthman’s governor of Egypt, Abdullah ibn Saad ibn Abi 
Sarh, offered a larger share of war spoils to those willing to render military support.113  
Since this act would inevitably decrease their share of the profits, elites within the 
caliphate’s core became upset over this.114 
As if the challenges that arose from the conflict between the caliphal core and 
periphery weren’t injurious enough, they were further complicated by Uthman’s inability 
to exercise the authority necessary to deal with them.  As previously noted, Uthman’s 
selection to the post of caliph was contingent upon his willingness to follow the policies 
of his two predecessors.  For Abu Bakr and Umar, the limited religious and political 
authorities they possessed were sufficient to deal with the problems of their time, though 
Umar apparently recognized that the tipping point was coming.  During Uthman’s tenure, 
the mounting problems of taxing, administering, and defending a large and diverse 
empire eventually surpassed the scope of the limited caliphal authorities he inherited.115  
Elites within the state wanted the caliph’s powers to remain limited because they wanted 
to ensure their influence and interests were protected, but the challenges of governance 
and spirit of independence that grew within the provinces required greater central 
authority.  Uthman was caught between these two opposing forces, and his attempts to 
exert greater authority eventually contributed to his downfall.116 
3. The Exercise of Power 
Although the motives behind many of Uthman’s decisions are widely interpreted 
today the complexity of the problems he faced required a greater level of authority to 
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properly deal with than what he inherited from Umar.117  Uthman was forced to balance 
the conflicting interests of both the core and periphery with the practical necessity of 
effectively administering the caliphate and defending it from rival powers.  An 
examination of his policies suggests that his actions were largely focused on those two 
problems.  To maintain the precarious balance between the wishes of the core’s elites and 
the budding independence of the provinces, Uthman intervened in questions of resource 
distribution and directed the launch of a new series of military campaigns to open new 
sources of revenue.118  To effectively administer and defend the caliphate, Uthman 
appointed loyal—but capable—family members to important posts, used state funds to 
garner support for his policies and strengthen his political position as caliph, and sought 
to prevent possible religious disputes by standardizing the Qur’an into a single 
version.119 
Achieving a balance between the desires of the growing periphery and the 
traditional power base of the caliphate was a nearly impossible task, because neither side 
seemed willing to place their own interests below the good of the state.  Uthman did 
indeed try to balance those interests, as evidenced by several instances of intervention in 
disputes over resource distribution.  In the Kufan land administration case mentioned 
earlier, Uthman attempted to assert control over the system to prevent the financial gains 
from remaining solely in the hands of the qurra.120  When complaints over the Egyptian 
governor’s strict taxation policies were registered, Uthman sent an envoy to look into the 
matter.121  The caliph also took measures to ensure that the large number of immigrants 
moving from the center of the state into the provinces received payments from the 
treasury to supplement their share of the war spoils.122  Another major policy Uthman 
enacted to further the interests of both the core and periphery was the opening of a new 
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series of military campaigns to bring in additional sources of revenue.123  These 
campaigns were directed farther westward into North Africa, northward into the Caspian 
region, and eastward beyond Persia.124 
In an effort to enhance the effectiveness of governance and security of the 
caliphate, Uthman enacted several other policies.  First, in a move criticized as nepotistic, 
he appointed a number of family members to important posts, especially within the 
provinces.  The budding independent nature of the periphery and their squabbles with the 
core over resource distribution prompted Uthman to exert greater control over the 
provinces, and he did so by placing the governorships of Kufa, Basra, and Egypt in the 
hands of loyal family members.125  (Uthman’s cousin, Mu’awiya, was already the 
governor of Syria at the beginning of the third caliph’s term).126  Second, in what Shaban 
viewed as a move to solidify support for Uthman’s policies back home, the caliph took 
greater liberties with the core’s share of war spoils than his predecessors had done and 
apparently created a system of patronage to reward those who rendered political 
support.127  The third major decision Uthman made was to allow the standardization of 
the Qur’an into one single version.  Before this decision, several variants were used, and 
the action was meant to forestall any future problems with interpretation.128 
Unfortunately for Uthman and the validity of his post, his policies were not well 
received.  His efforts to balance the conflicting interests of the rapidly expanding umma 
and impose a greater degree of authority over the caliphate caused him to lose a great 
deal of support.  Whether his increased involvement in resource distribution, appointment 
of family members to important posts, development of a patronage system, and 
standardization of the Qur’an were driven by nepotism and corruption or were simply 
measures he deemed necessary to govern effectively, they were wholly unpopular.  Thus, 
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when rebellious factions from Egypt and Iraq encircled his home for almost 50 days to 
force his resignation in 656, Uthman’s closest supporters—including many of the 
Prophet’s surviving companions, abandoned him.  Eventually, some members of the 
angry mob broke into Uthman’s home and murdered him while his open Qur’an rested on 
his lap.129  
4. Evolution of the State under Uthman 
The caliphate underwent tremendous changes during Uthman’s tenure.  From a 
territorial standpoint, growth did occur—though it was far less rapid and far more costly 
than the previous expansion seen during earlier caliphs’ reigns.130  Under Uthman’s 
leadership, a navy was constructed, enabling the caliphate to invade Cyprus in 649, raid 
Rhodes and Kos in 654, and challenge Byzantine naval dominance in the eastern 
Mediterranean.131  The caliphate’s consolidation of the remnants of the Sassanid Empire 
was completed in 651, and territory from Armenia was added in 653.132  Around that 
time, these early conquests had reached their limits and the now idle military, with no 
new lands to conquer and extract spoils from, became restless again.  This restiveness 
along the geographical fringes of the caliphate, coupled with the growing disparity of 
wealth between the caliphate’s interior and exterior and the widespread perception that 
Uthman’s regime was wrought with corruption and nepotism, led to the third caliph’s 
assassination.  The assassination marked the beginning of severe tribal fractioning that 
continued into the reign of the fourth caliph, Ali.133 
Politically, Uthman’s assassination meant that the post of caliph was broken.  The 
willingness of several disenfranchised factions to conspire against the caliph, who had 
been one of the Prophet’s closest companions, was troublesome.  Additionally, the fact 
that elites within the state, many of whom had also been close to the Prophet, essentially 
stepped aside and allowed the murder to happen is even more confounding.  This series 
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of events provides evidence of two major developments that occurred within the umma 
during the course of Uthman’s reign.  First, sub-state interests from aspects of both the 
periphery and core of the caliphate had grown so profoundly that the well-being of the 
state and the sanctity of the caliph position were considered secondary by some within 
the umma.134  Second, though most Muslims believed Uthman’s assassination was 
wrong, a small segment of the umma believed that the caliph’s immoral actions (or 
“innovations”) provided sufficient grounds for his assassination.135  The willingness of 
certain groups to forcibly remove a ruler they considered to be immoral opened the 
debate over the legality of opposition to unjust Muslim rulers that persists to this day—
especially within contemporary Salafist circles, as will be discussed later.136 
E. ALI’S ASCENSION AND THE ORIGINATION OF THE SUNNI-SHI’A 
SPLIT 
1. Composition of the State 
The abhorrent assassination of Uthman left the caliphate in a state of turmoil.  
Factionalism and self-interest had essentially dissolved the unity of the caliphate and 
struck a blow to the sanctity of the post of caliph.  Egypt, still angry, refused to supply 
Medina with grain.137  While the Umayyad clan—now led by Mu’awiya—fumed over 
Uthman’s assassination and demanded justice, the companions who had failed to protect 
the murdered caliph quickly offered the vacant post to Ali. 138   As the cousin, son-in-
law, and earliest male convert of the Prophet, Ali’s stature should have made his right to 
lead the umma indisputable; however, his unwillingness to endorse Abu Bakr until six 
months after the latter’s selection to replace Mohammad, reluctance to succeed Umar 
without significantly expanded caliphal authority, and own failure to defend the besieged 
Uthman  
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during his time of crisis generated opposition to Ali’s ascension to power.139  Despite this 
opposition, Ali reluctantly assumed the mantle of leadership for the fractioning caliphate, 
and immediately set about to repair it.140 
2. Challenges Faced By the State 
  During Ali’s five-year reign, he was confronted with numerous challenges that 
threatened to rip the caliphate apart.  Among these many challenges, three of them had 
the greatest impact on his rule and the future of the state.  First, the empire Ali inherited 
was in turmoil.  Although Uthman’s murder may have been gratifying for his enemies, 
the terrible deed, by itself, did nothing to resolve the grievances against him, and the 
passions of the various parties involved were about to boil over.141  Second, throughout 
the course of his tenure, Ali was perpetually caught between competing factions that 
sought to advance their own interests at the expense of their rivals and the welfare of the 
state.142  Third, Ali’s attempts to exercise power and quell the problems he faced 
invariably affected one or more of the state’s prominent factions, leading to constant 
resistance to his policies.143  Ali was faced with three separate rebellions that threatened 
his rule and irrevocably fractured the umma.144  Each of these problems will be 
addressed separately. 
In its simplest form, the most immediate problem Ali was confronted with can be 
described by one word: passion.  As discussed earlier, numerous parties had at least an 
indirect measure of involvement in Uthman’s murder, and emotions ran high among 
every one of those groups.  The Egyptian and Iraqi mobs that had besieged the late 
caliph’s home and demanded his resignation were furious over their perception that the 
government was rife with corruption and nepotism.  For some Egyptians within this mob, 
the rage was strong enough to elicit an act of murder.  Uthman’s death, however 
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gratifying it may have been for them, did not immediately resolve their grievances.145  
Among many of the elites within the state, passion must have also been a factor in their 
disloyalty to the caliph and unwillingness to protect him from the deadly mob.  
Regardless of how the other companions felt about Uthman’s policies, their nearness to 
the caliph and to the Prophet himself could not have been ignored lightly; strong emotion 
had to have been involved.  And for Mu’awiya and the other Umayyads, the murder of 
their fellow clansman was infuriating and required swift justice.146     
The second problem Ali faced was a problem that was familiar to each of his 
predecessors: the existence of numerous factions with often-competing interests.147  The 
web of factions and interests that Ali would be forced to contend with was extremely 
intricate.  At the macro level, the longstanding conflict between the periphery and core 
persisted.  Egypt and Iraq, especially, remained at odds with the core of the state over 
their perceived unfair treatment and improper governmental control levied by corrupt and 
nepotistic officials.148  Within the core of the state, conflict between various factions also 
continued, most notably between the Qurayshites—intent on preserving their dominance 
in the government—and the ansar of Medina.149  Inter-provincial conflict existed, 
including a particular case where Syria’s refusal to admit immigrants was decried by the 
other provinces who were forced to absorb all of them.150  Ali found himself involved in 
intra-provincial conflicts as well.  Kufa was particularly troublesome for the caliph 
because factionalism within that province led to the fracturing of his coalition of 
supporters and enabled Ali’s eventual demise.151 
The third major problem Ali faced was a series of rebellions waged by separate 
factions opposed to his policies.  The first serious threat came from three prominent 
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companions who were eager to preserve Qurayshite control over the state.152  While 
traveling in Iraq, Ali’s party clashed with a force led by Talha ibn Ubaydullah and 
Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, two companions of the Prophet whom Ali had allegedly denied 
political appointments and A’isha bint Abu Bakr, the Prophet’s beloved widow.153  
During the Battle of the Camel (so named because the fighting occurred near the camel 
A’isha was riding), 10,000 fighters perished, and Ali emerged victorious.154  Shortly after 
this triumph, Ali faced a second major insurrection when Mu’awiya, outraged over Ali’s 
failure to vigorously investigate Uthman’s murder, confronted him with a sizeable force 
of Syrian troops.155  Ali’s forces attacked the rebellious army in a series of battles at 
Siffin in northern Syria in 657.156  Half-hearted fighting between Mu’awiya’s forces and 
Ali’s supporters—many of whom were members of the qurra—was interrupted when 
Mu’awiya’s reserves entered the battle with Qur’ans affixed to their spears as an appeal 
that the issue should be settled peacefully.157  Ali agreed to accept arbitration, and when 
the battle ended with neither side accepting defeat, a sizeable number of Ali’s forces 
abandoned him because they were angry that the caliph had treated with the enemy.158  
These rebels, known as the Kharijites, were eventually defeated by Ali in 658, but the 
caliph’s loss of prestige and the growing stature of Mu’awiya prompted a series of 
provincial defections to Mu’awiya’s faction.159  Ali’s reign came to a bitter end when he 
was assassinated by a Kharijite in 661, opening the door for Mu’awiya’s ascension as 
caliph and establishment of a new dynasty under the Umayyads.160 
                                                 
152 Ibid., 71.  
153 Ibid. 
154 Saunders, History of Medieval Islam, 64. 
155 Shaban, Islamic History, 74. 
156 Saunders, History of Medieval Islam, 64. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid., 65. 
159 Ibid., 66. 
160 Ibid., 66–67. 
 40 
3. The Exercise of Power 
To save a caliphate plagued by flaring passions, growing corruption, and cutthroat 
factionalism, Ali believed that change was necessary, not only within the political sphere 
but within the religious sphere as well.161  He concluded that while they were still 
unquestionably valid, the Qur’an and the acts of Mohammad and the first three caliphs 
had to be “reinterpreted to meet the needs of the time.”162  In adopting this premise, Ali 
demonstrated his willingness to imbue the post of caliph with greater religious power in 
an effort to accomplish political objectives more effectively.163  On most matters, Ali 
took bold and decisive action: he enacted drastic measures to eliminate nepotism and 
corruption and to promote greater justice and equality throughout the caliphate.  
However, his inaction in several key instances resulted in a failure to quell the passions 
and overcome the factionalism that would eventually rip the umma apart.164  The 
resultant Shi’a-Sunni split fuels conflict that still resonates to this day. 
To deal with rampant nepotism, corruption, and injustice within the caliphate, Ali 
implemented three major changes.  The first of these changes, effected early in his tenure, 
was the removal of many of the officials appointed by Uthman in what Saunders referred 
to as a “clean sweep” of the caliphate’s leadership.165  While this measure certainly 
addressed the main grievance that had been levied against Uthman, it angered those who 
wanted to preserve the status quo, including Talha, Zubayr, A’isha, and other prominent 
Qurayshites.166  Resentment over the removal of Uthman’s officials sparked the first 
major rebellion against Ali, which culminated in the Battle of the Camel discussed 
earlier.  The second major change that Ali implemented was the leveling of the status of 
later Muslims with that of the earliest believers.167  He recognized the importance of the 
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contributions made by later generations in expanding the empire and chose to give them 
an equal share of the wealth that the caliphate had accumulated.168  This measure, while 
bolstering Ali’s position in the eyes of much of the caliphate’s periphery, fueled greater 
discontent among the elites within the core.169  The third major change Ali pursued was 
the elimination of Syria’s privileged status among the other provinces.170  Under Umar 
and Uthman, Syria was shielded from receiving immigrants under the rationale that the 
province’s proximity to the Byzantine Empire required it to be free from the immigration 
nuisance that challenged the other provinces.171  Ali believed that protecting one’s 
borders was the responsibility of every province, and Syria deserved no special 
accommodations.172  Mu’awiya’s disagreement was a large factor in the Syrian rebellion 
against Ali.173  The nature of Ali’s beliefs and actions attracted many disadvantaged 
factions to his camp, especially the ansar of Medina, the qurra of Kufa, and many former 
ridda leaders.174  Unfortunately for Ali, factionalism and passion would eventually lead 
to the splintering of his own coalition that would lead to his eventual demise. 
While many of Ali’s bold actions generated substantial opposition to his rule, it 
was Ali’s inaction at several critical points that eventually led to his demise—and the 
birth of the Shi’a-Sunni divide.  The first instance occurred immediately after Ali 
assumed the mantle of caliph.  While the Muslim community stood in shock over the 
assassination of Uthman, and with the powerful Umayyad family seething with anger, Ali 
allowed a perfect opportunity to strengthen his legitimacy escape by failing to vigorously 
pursue the third caliph’s murders.175  The second instance, which was equally damaging 
to Ali’s legitimacy, occurred when he chose not to press his advantage against 
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Mu’awiya’s forces in 657 and agreed to accept arbitration instead.176  The Syrians were 
on the verge of defeat, and the victory could have asserted Ali’s dominance over the 
rebellious province and their leader.177  Instead, Ali’s unwillingness to press the fight led 
to the splintering of his coalition and birth of the Kharijite rebellion, and the inconclusive 
results of the arbitration he allowed failed to settle the matter of leadership, dealing a 
severe blow to Ali’s legitimacy.178   
4. Evolution of the State under Ali 
With a leader who openly embraced change, the caliphate was destined to evolve 
during Ali’s tenure.  Ironically, despite his efforts to introduce meaningful reforms, the 
evolution that occurred was not what he intended.  Three dramatic changes occurred 
during Ali’s five-year tenure.  First, the caliphate essentially divided into two separate 
states over the question of rightful ownership of the caliph position.  The insurrections 
led by Talha and Zubayr, Mu’awiya, and the Kharijites resulted in thousands of Muslim-
on-Muslim deaths, but the inconclusive arbitration at Siffin left neither Ali nor Mu’awiya 
as the undisputed leader of the caliphate.179  With Ali’s legitimacy and position 
immensely degraded, Mu’awiya was able to obtain Egypt’s loyalty and incorporate it into 
his sphere of control before he himself was proclaimed caliph in 660—six months before 
Ali’s assassination.180   
The second major change occurred within the community of believers.  During 
Ali’s tumultuous reign, the umma—often divided in political interests but firmly united 
on religious grounds—fragmented into three separate communities.  Mohammad had 
taught that the path to salvation required the followership of an appropriate religious 
authority, and the early community saw the precarious position of having to choose 
between loyalty to Ali, Mu’awiya, or neither as a test from God.  Choosing incorrectly 
was akin to following a false imam and warranted eternal damnation.  Believers 
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essentially had three choices, and their selection placed them squarely in a new, separate 
community.  Uthmanis believed that Uthman’s reign was righteous, death was unjust, and 
cousin was the correct heir as caliph.  Ali’s party, the Shi’at Ali (or Shi’a), believed that 
Uthman’s actions were immoral and his refusal to step down as caliph justified his 
assassination, making Ali was the rightful caliph.  Kharijites believed that Ali’s 
acceptance of arbitration at Siffin represented an abdication of caliphal authority, thus 
invalidating Ali’s claim to power.  This splitting of the umma laid the foundation for 
further divergence between the communities that would occur over the next 13-plus 
centuries.181 
The third major change that occurred during Ali’s reign was, as Saunders noted, 
the end of “pure theocracy” within the caliphate.182  As discussed earlier, the umma 
attributed a heavy significance to the religious leadership of the caliph.  However, this 
significance was mostly symbolic; without the Prophethood status that Mohammad 
enjoyed, the post’s actual religious authority was limited.  Ali’s attempt to introduce 
greater religious power to the caliph position ended in bitter failure, and Mu’awiya, 
learning from this lesson, avoided the pretense of religious authority when assuming the 
mantle of leadership after Ali’s death.  This veritable divorce of political and religious 
authority was symbolized by the relocation of the caliphate’s political capital to Syria, 
while the religious center remained in the Hijaz.183   
F. SUMMARY 
The reality of the revered Rightly Guided Caliphate period was extremely 
complex.  On one level, the Rightly Guided Caliphate was extraordinarily successful: in 
the span of a few short decades, the humble state founded by Mohammad grew into one 
of the most powerful empires of its day, and its growth was accompanied by a new 
religious denomination that changed the character of Middle Eastern civilization.  On 
another level, this astonishing expansion of both state and religion was not without 
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growing pains: three of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs were assassinated, two of which 
were by fellow Muslims; four major rebellions were violently repressed, which resulted 
in the tragedy of thousands of Muslim verses Muslim deaths; the unity of the umma was 
irrevocably damaged, leading to the eventual Sunni-Shi’a split; and civil war ripped the 
caliphate into two separate states near the end of the period.  An examination of the 
composition, function, and evolution of the Rightly Guided Caliphate revealed two 
major, recurring themes: the constant influence of factionalism and group-interest posed a 
continual threat to the unity of the caliphate, and each caliphs’ struggles to exert the 
necessary political and religious control over the growing state was resisted by elites and 
contributed to even greater factionalism and strife.   These themes validate this chapter’s 
hypothesis, which posited that the tremendous turmoil existent within the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate was a function of the political challenges the caliphs faced, and that the nature 
of those challenges drove them to respond in ways that do not appear to be consistent 
with the actions and teachings of the Prophet. 
The first theme, the prevalence of factionalism throughout multiple levels of the 
empire, influenced the Rightly Guided Caliphs to rely much more on the use of force to 
subvert this powerful tendency than the Prophet did before them.  Abu Bakr and Ali both 
faced insurrections that required military action to suppress.  Abu Bakr, Umar, and to a 
lesser extent, Uthman, were forced to launch military campaigns to mitigate the negative 
effects of factionalism; tribal groups were encouraged to conduct external raids and 
participate in military expeditions to keep them from fighting each other, and the steady 
flow of booty into the treasury made it easier to forestall arguments between the elite 
factions within the core of the state over the allocation of resources.  Similarly, Uthman’s 
failure to use force probably contributed to his assassination at the hands of angry 
Egyptian and Iraqi factions.184  The Rightly Guided Caliphs’ necessary use of force 
contrasted with the Prophet’s ability to obtain the loyalty of Arabian Bedouin factions 
and to hasten the ultimate fall of Mecca through savvy political maneuvering.185 
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The second major theme that recurred throughout this chapter which validated its 
hypothesis was the struggle faced by each Rightly Guided Caliph to define or adapt their 
caliphal role to best address the challenges of the times.  Unlike Mohammad, the caliphs 
did not enjoy the divine authority and status that Prophethood demanded, yet each was 
still responsible for adequately governing the state and providing religious leadership to 
the umma.  As the caliphate grew, the number and complexity of the challenges 
increased, but any attempt to assume greater caliphal authority represented a conflict with 
some faction’s interests and was vigorously opposed.  Abu Bakr began as a part-time, 
unpaid caliph before the magnitude of problems before him convinced the umma that a 
full-time leader was necessary.  Umar was said to have considered abolishing the post 
due to his inability to garner the political authority necessary to properly govern the 
growing state.  Uthman’s attempts to exert greater political and modestly increased 
religious authority, broadly seen as acts of nepotism and corruption, hastened his 
assassination.  Ali’s claim to greater political and religious power and desire to reinterpret 
key elements of Islamic tradition to enact important political reforms led to rebellion and 
civil war, creating a rift in the fabric of the umma that preceded the eventual Sunni-Shi’a 
divide.  While the Rightly Guided Caliphs’ attempts to expand their political and 
religious authority led to increased turmoil within the caliphate and were opposed on the 
grounds of exceeding the Prophet’s mandate, they were undertaken in the interest of 
caliphal security and governmental efficiency.186  
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III. CONTEMPORARY SALAFISM’S INTERPRETATION OF 
THE RIGHTLY GUIDED CALIPHATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the Rightly Guided Caliphate period was 
tremendously complex.  The era was marked by extraordinary expansion; a humble state 
became an empire and a young religious denomination established permanent roots in 
large portions of two continents during the reign of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs.  
Unfortunately, this remarkable expansion was accompanied by persistent turmoil and 
massive bloodshed, making contemporary Salafism’s emulation of the period seem 
highly illogical.  This chapter will discuss the contemporary Salafist narrative of the 
Rightly Guided Caliphate to establish the reasons why the period is so important to the 
movement.  It will begin by providing the context necessary to understand this narrative, 
including an overview of the roots and doctrine of the contemporary Salafist movement 
and a brief overview of the various factions that comprise it.  The chapter will then 
explore the narrative itself, looking at contemporary Salafists’ treatment of the earliest 
Muslim leaders’ beliefs and actions, acknowledgement or denial of the companions’ 
misdeeds and any associated explanations for them, and perception of the unity of the 
umma during the period.  The facts surrounding the history, doctrine, and narrative of the 
contemporary Salafist movement are expected to support the second major hypothesis 
this study will explore: contemporary Salafists ignore the negative aspects of the Rightly 
Guided Caliphate because they are prejudiced by a desire to reinvent the period in a way 
that better supports their religious and political objectives.   
B. THE ROOTS AND DOCTRINE OF CONTEMPORARY SALAFISM 
Although today’s version is fundamentally different in many regards, 
contemporary Salafism is an extension of the modern Salafist movement that began in the 
late 1800s.  Led by the visionary reformers Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mohammad Abduh, 
and Rashid Rida, the modern Salafist movement addressed the decline of the Muslim 
world relative to the West by calling for internal reforms to strengthen the community 
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and its international position.187  The movement’s two earliest leaders, al-Afghani and 
Abduh, believed that the Islamic world failed to keep pace with the West because it 
resisted a reinterpretation of Islam (or ijtihad) that was necessary to retain its 
relevance.188  They argued that while the core principles of Islam were absolute and 
unchangeable, the employment of those principles must be adapted to meet the needs of 
the times.189  They blamed the decline of Islamic society on the traditionalists’ rejection 
of reason, Sufi fatalism, and the exercise of folk practices such as saint worship and 
miracle working—and called for a reversal of these societal concepts.190  Al-Afghani and 
Abduh also believed that Islam and science were fully compatible and that some aspects 
of Western civilization were worthy of emulation.191  Under the later leadership of Rida, 
however, the movement’s ideology evolved into a version closer to what contemporary 
Salafists embrace today.  Rida believed that Islam could solve the world’s problems 
independently from other influences, was skeptical of Western values, and feared that the 
use of reason in the Muslim world would eventually lead to secularization.192  Instead of 
looking to the West for guidance, he admonished Muslims to look to the foundation of 
Islam: the Qur’an and the Sunna, as interpreted by the Prophet’s companions.193  Rida 
also advocated the restoration of the caliphate, believing that Islamic government was 
necessary to enforce Islamic law.194 
Although it has undergone a significant transformation since the Salafist revival 
of the 19th and 20th centuries, many of those earlier core beliefs are still found in the 
present day manifestation of the Salafist movement.  The movement has seen significant 
growth, with a multitude of Salafist organizations in existence today.  Nuances in 
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intentions and methods are found among them, but these organizations all share a 
common religious doctrine.  This doctrine (or aqida) is heavily predicated upon a belief 
in the oneness (tawhid) of God, calls for a strict adherence to the Qur’an and Sunna, and 
rejects all attempts to innovate, or deviate from, the unchangeable principles of God’s 
word and the acts of the Prophet.  
Tawhid, the central theme of contemporary Salafist doctrine, is comprised of 
three separate principles.  Contemporary Salafists believe that the acceptance of all three 
is necessary to be a true Muslim, as they are all manifestations of belief.  The first says 
that there is only one God, Allah, and that he alone created—and will forever rule—the 
universe.  The second principle expresses the notion that God is wholly unique, and does 
not share power with any aspect of his creation.  Therefore, God’s law (or Sharia) is 
absolute, and mankind is obliged to follow it completely.  Human-inspired institutions 
and laws must be rejected because they represent a usurpation of God’s role and a 
challenge to His sovereignty.  The third principle states that only God is worthy of 
worship.  For contemporary Salafists, this not only means the forbiddance of practices 
like saint worship and prayer through intercessors, but also that one’s actions in life must 
conform to the guidelines set forth in God’s law, because life itself is an act of worship 
and any actions that stray from His guidance represent unfaithfulness to Him.195   
Contemporary Salafists’ devotion to tawhid is accompanied by a zealous 
adherence to the Qur’an and the Sunna (as observed by the companions of the Prophet).  
They believe that the protection of tawhid requires both the stringent application of these 
two fundamental sources of Islam and the rejection of all other external sources.  
Otherwise, Muslims open the door to potential deviation from the true path by intentional 
and unintentional innovation (or bid’a).  Interestingly, Wiktorowicz noted that the 
ambiguity of many Qur’anic passages poses a challenge for contemporary Salafists 
seeking to apply them to modern problems.  As a result, the hadith’s role is extremely 
important to them, as he says, “perhaps even more important to Salafis than the Qur’an 
itself.”196  Consequently, the observations of the Prophet’s companions that are recorded 
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within those hadiths—which occurred, of course, during the Rightly Guided Caliphate 
period—are of tremendous value to contemporary Salafists of all stripes. 197 
The contemporary Salafists’ understanding of tawhid and the Qur’an and Sunna 
engender two important beliefs shared by each of their organizations.  First, 
contemporary Salafists believe that they, alone, represent a saved sect that was 
prophesized by Mohammad as a result of their strict adherence to the Qur’an and Sunna, 
which the Prophet commanded.  In his words, “I am leaving you with two things and you 
will never go astray as long as you cling to them.  They are the Book of Allah and my 
Sunna.”198  In the contemporary Salafist view, the other 72 of the 73 Muslim sects 
mentioned by Mohammad are doomed to hellfire because they are not “upon what I 
[Mohammad] and my Companions are upon.”199  Second, contemporary Salafists see 
themselves as being “embroiled in a battle against the rationalists and human desire.”200  
Contemporary Salafists zealously fight against both of these corrupting influences, which 
they believe have the capacity to contaminate Islam and lead the community astray.201  
To guard against contamination, contemporary Salafists call for a return to the formative 
period of Islam, which they consider to be pure.  Since knowledge is appreciated as an 
important weapon in their battle against innovation, contemporary Salafists place heavy 
emphasis on religious scholarship.202  Each Salafist organization’s pursuit of knowledge 
links it with a shared educational network, which in turn perpetuates the common belief 
structure found amongst them all.203 
C. SALAFIST ORGANIZATIONS 
Although they share the common belief structure previously discussed, 
contemporary Salafist organizations differ greatly on their preferred means for realizing 
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the purification of Islamic society they so desire.  As Wiktorowicz explains, these 
organizations can be best classified as belonging to one of three factions: the more 
established and traditional purists, the younger generation of politicos, and the radically-
minded jihadis.204  While all contemporary Salafists view themselves as being engaged 
in a constant struggle against the forces of innovation and believe that every Salafist 
faction espouses the correct belief structure, each of the three factions believes that they, 
alone, are following the guidance of Mohammad properly through their own unique 
methods of purifying Islamic society.205 
As the name implies, purists champion a methodology they believe to be the most 
pure of all contemporary Salafist factions.  Their primary focus is on the purification of 
Islam and the protection of their religion from all corrupting influences—whether internal 
or external.  Purists believe that the purification of Islam must be the primary goal of 
Salafists because political activism and the application of violence are both 
counterproductive methods that could do greater damage to Islamic society than good.  
They cite the example of Mohammad during the earliest days of Islam, when his small 
group of believers was living under the constant threat of annihilation by Meccan elites.  
Instead of fomenting insurrection and conspiracy, the Prophet was able to spread Islam in 
a peaceful and subtle manner on the strength of its own merits.  If Mohammad was able 
to successfully propagate Islam in this manner, purists argue, the use of politics and 
violence in today’s world are unnecessary innovations that contradict the Prophetic 
model.206    
Purists see another parallel between Mohammad’s earliest Meccan days and the 
present: they believe that the very existence of Islam is threatened today, just as it was 
before the Hijra (the Prophet’s flight to Medina in 622).  Purists believe that the West is 
determined to destroy Islam by undermining Muslim values and replacing them with 
Western ones.207  To protect Islam from this external threat, like the Prophet did long 
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ago, purists call for the promulgation of Salafist beliefs through purification, knowledge, 
and education. 208  Politics and violence are rejected as innovation because the Prophet 
did not use those methods.  While most purists believe their politically- and violence-
oriented colleagues are well-intentioned, they believe the latter two factions present a 
grave internal threat to Islam because politicos and jihadis assign a higher degree of 
importance to their own goals than to the purification of Islam and allow reason and 
strategy to determine how they will use religious evidence to advance their causes (as 
opposed to allowing the message of Islam to speak for itself, like Mohammad did).209  As 
a result of their fixation with purity, the purists have largely isolated themselves, actively 
avoiding dialogue with non-Muslims and blocking their followers’ exposure to alternate 
Salafist viewpoints—even in cases where the motive is to seek evidence for counter-
argument.210 Consequently, purist Salafism is simultaneously peaceful, yet 
uncompromising.  The main source of purist Salafism is the Saudi Arabian religious 
establishment, where purist leadership remains deeply entrenched.211 
Like the purists, Salafi politicos are staunchly committed to the Salafist creed, the 
protection of tawhid, and the purification of Islamic society.  Additionally, the politicos 
share (if not surpass) the purists’ disdain for and mistrust of the West, believing that 
Western influence in Muslim lands presents a severe threat to Islam itself.212  The point 
of departure for politicos is their view that the purists’ apolitical stance—in an age where 
both corrupt Muslim leaders and unchecked Western influence endanger the sanctity of 
tawhid and the purity of Islam—invalidates purist methodology.213  Instead, the politicos 
believe that political activism is required to establish the temporal conditions necessary 
for the proper defense of Islam.  They view political action as not only necessary as a 
matter of practicality, but also as being morally obligatory.  Politicos admonish Muslims  
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to familiarize themselves with current events, engage in political discussion, and evaluate 
their rulers in order to adequately protect Islam from corrupting influences, even those 
that may come from within. 214 
While they sharply disagree with the purists’ opposition to political activism, 
politicos largely respect their elder faction’s religious scholarship and knowledge.  
Despite this acknowledgement of the purists’ religious expertise, however, politicos 
believe that the purists’ limited knowledge and experience with current events and 
international affairs precludes effective judgment and religious leadership.  Within Saudi 
Arabia—the seat of contemporary Salafism—the division between purists and politicos 
was solidified in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.215  Presumably under 
pressure from the Saudi rulers, the leaders of the purist camp issued a fatwa accepting the 
presence of U.S. troops in the Holy Land as a response to Saddam Hussein’s 
aggression.216  Politicos publicly disagreed with the fatwa, arguing that the purists failed 
to understand the true Western motivation behind the deployment—gaining a foothold 
from which the Muslim world would eventually be subjugated.217  For politicos, the 
purists’ stance was evidence of their limited understanding of world events, borne from 
decades of conscious avoidance of politics.  From the purist perspective, the politicos’ 
willingness to engage in political action is perilous because the latter is too young, 
inexperienced, and ignorant of Islamic theology to use politics effectively.  Purists argue 
that political action without adequate religious knowledge invites emotion and 
rationalism, which endangers Islam.  The disagreement between the two factions has 
become known as the debate over the jurisprudence of current affairs (or al-fiqh al-waqi), 
and in many ways represents a not only a dispute between opposing viewpoints, but a 
generational struggle (between the older purists and younger politicos) as well.218   
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Although the purists’ apolitical version of Salafism remains the most dominant 
among the three factions, political activism is on the rise among Salafist and Salafism-
inspired groups.  Besides Saudi Arabia, where the influence of politicos has grown 
significantly since the 1980s and 90s, Salafists have entered into politics elsewhere.  
While political parties are not technically permitted in Kuwait and Bahrain, Salafists in 
each of those states have held well-established blocs within their parliaments for several 
decades.  The advent of the Arab Spring has also fueled Salafi political activism, as 
Salafist political groups have emerged to attempt to influence the direction of governance 
in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Lebanon during the last two years.  Though they 
represent but a minority of the population in each of those countries, the appeal of Salafi 
political parties continues to rise as they provide an alternative to liberal-minded parties 
and moderate Islamist parties like the Muslim Brotherhood.219 
The third major faction within the contemporary Salafist movement is the jihadi 
faction.  Jihadis share a common goal with their purist and politico counterparts: the 
purification of Islamic society through protection of tawhid and strict adherence to the 
Qur’an and Sunna.  However, the point of departure for jihadis lies in their preferred 
methodology for achieving this purification, as they encourage the use of violence over 
education, example, and political activism.220  Whereas most contemporary Salafist 
scholars strongly dispute the legitimacy of violence, jihadis consider its use to be 
justifiable because of the significance of the threat posed to Islam by Western 
influence.221  To counter this profound threat, jihadis argue, jihad represents a legitimate 
form of da’wa (propagation of Islam) that must be used to purge the Islamic world of 
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corrupting Western influence and establish an Islamic society that is free from it.222  Like 
politicos, the trajectory of Salafist jihadism has been influenced heavily by a 
disagreement with both the Saudi government and purists on the issue of allowing 
Western military forces to be based on Saudi holy land.223    
The roots of Salafist jihadism can be traced to the Soviet invasion and occupation 
of Afghanistan in the 1980s.  Saudi and other Arab Salafists who traveled to Afghanistan 
to fight with the mujahedeen were introduced to the radicalized version of Islam 
espoused by organizations like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad, and 
the experience of combat against the infidel invaders further solidified their belief in the 
relevance of violence in protecting and purifying Islamic society.224  Throughout the 
1990s, Salafist jihadis who returned to Saudi Arabia became disenchanted by both the 
government’s repression of leading politicos who spoke out against the hosting of 
American forces and their perception that purists supported the government’s actions.  
During this period, the jihadis’ relationship with the purists became much more 
adversarial.  Jihadis argued that the purists’ blind support of Saudi rulers under these 
circumstances was indicative of an inability to properly interpret and convey Islam to the 
community of believers.  Since politicos and jihadis had demonstrated a willingness to 
oppose the government’s relationship with the West, they alone were free from undue 
influence and thus represented the only agents properly equipped to interpret and reveal 
the truth of Islam.225   
For jihadis, mere opposition to pro-Western governmental policies is insufficient 
in many cases where the sanctity of Tawhid is at stake.  Jihadis believe that regimes 
presiding over Muslim countries and who are unwilling to divorce themselves from 
Western influence and any associated secular tendencies can be declared apostates, 
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through a process known as takfir, and legitimately overthrown.226  While all three 
contemporary Salafist factions agree that the concept of takfir is a valid one, its 
applicability in the case of Muslim rulers is widely disputed amongst them.  Purists argue 
that Muslim rulers, despite their fallibility, have shown no evidence of rejecting Islam in 
their hearts, and therefore cannot be declared apostates.227  Conversely, Jihadis and 
politicos argue that one’s true beliefs can be inferred through his or her actions, so rulers 
observed engaging in un-Islamic practices can be rightfully determined to have rejected 
Islam.228  In the jihadi view, such apostate rulers must be removed—by force, if 
necessary.  In addition to their ongoing conflicts with the West, prominent Salafist jihadi 
organizations such as al-Qaeda, the al-Nusra Front, and Ansar al-Sunna have attempted to 
overthrow the Saudi, Syrian, and Iraqi regimes on the grounds of takfir.  
D. THE NARRATIVE 
To ascertain the importance of the Rightly Guided Caliphate to the contemporary 
Salafist movement, this study examined a range of sources, including the works of 
prominent purist Salafi scholars Mohammad Nasiruddin al-Albani and Aziz bin Baz, 
politico Salafist leader Safar al-Hawali, and well-known Salafist jihadis Osama bin Laden 
and Ayman al-Zawahiri.  Despite their differences about proper means for purifying 
Islamic society, each of these leaders espoused similar beliefs about the nature of the 
Rightly Guided Caliphate period and about the caliphs and the Prophet’s companions 
themselves whose actions shaped its history.  The narrative regarding four specific topics 
is useful in obtaining a deeper understanding of the importance of the period and why it is 
revered by contemporary Salafists: the Rightly Guided Caliphs’ and fellow companions’ 
beliefs and actions, the existence of and reasons behind caliphal misdeeds, the unity of 
the umma during the Rightly Guided Caliphate period, and the emergence of the Sunni-
Shi’a rift.  Each of these topics are described in detail below. 
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1. Views on the Caliphs’ and Companions’ Beliefs and Actions 
Since the beliefs and actions of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and their fellow 
companions played a crucial role in shaping the trajectory of Islam during the critical 
years following the Prophet’s death, an examination of the contemporary Salafist 
narrative regarding this topic is useful in obtaining a greater understanding of why the 
period is so important to them.  Two key concepts are found in this narrative: the 
infallibility of the actions of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, their fellow companions, and 
the entire umma as a group and their combined dedication to preserving the sanctity of 
Islam.  For contemporary Salafists, in addition to the Prophet’s command to do so, this 
notion of infallibility and belief in the companions’ zealous defense against impurity 
forms the basis for why modern-day Muslims are determined to follow their example. 
The central theme of the contemporary Salafist narrative concerning the beliefs 
and actions of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and the other companions of the Prophet 
focuses on the infallibility of the group as a whole.  In one of his famous fatwas, al-
Albani discussed this notion of infallibility when he explained that “one who ascribes 
himself to the Salaf As-Saalih (righteous predecessors) . . . ascribes himself to 
infallibility”229 and by declaring that “there is the infallibility of the Companions of the 
Prophet, sall Allaahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, [meaning peace upon him] (as a whole).”230  For 
contemporary Salafists, this infallibility was characterized in several different ways.  In 
his fatwa “the Sacred Salafee Methodology,” al-Albani explained that the actions of the 
companions were righteous and worthy of emulation because these earliest Muslims were 
“all upon true guidance from their Lord” as they had “learnt from the Revelation which 
was sent down upon the heart of their Prophet (sallallaahu ‘alayhi wa sallam), fresh and 
pure, just as it was revealed.”231  Service of and submission to God was also an important 
trait that was manifested by these earliest Muslims, as Safar al-Hawali explained:  
The Companions and the righteous predecessors understood the Book of 
Allah and implemented it in knowledge and action, and they knew the 
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importance of the actions of the heart such as sincerity, certainty, 
truthfulness, love, etc.  As a result, they became true manifestations of 
complete servitude to Allah.232   
The second major theme found in the contemporary Salafist narrative regarding 
the beliefs and actions of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and the other companions addresses 
their stance on preserving the purity of Islam.  These earliest Muslims are seen as not 
only infallible in thought and action, but also as defenders against innovation.  In his 
fatwa “The Authentic Creed and the Invalidators of Islam,” bin Baz explained how the 
companions revered tawhid and held to the creed that they “should believe in all His 
Attributes without changing them, completely ignoring them, twisting their meanings, or 
claiming that they resemble human attributes.”233  Al-Albani added that “our righteous 
ancestors were furious in their anger against whoever preferred sayings . . . or the opinion 
of any person, whoever he was, to the Hadith of the Messenger of Allah.”234  
Unsurprisingly, Salafist jihadis cast the Rightly Guided Caliphs’ defense against 
innovation in an even more aggressive light.  In a treatise discussing the importance of 
adopting Sharia in the wake of the Arab Spring, al-Zawahiri wrote that the “rightly-
guided caliphs” were willing to “do jihad” to prevent the separation of Islam from 
politics.235  According to Salafist jihadis, the rejection of Sharia is an innovation.  For all 
contemporary Salafists, the companions provided modern Muslims with an example to be 
emulated not only through their submission to God’s will, but by vehemently protecting 
Islam from impurity. 
2. Treatment of Misdeeds 
While contemporary Salafists consider the Rightly Guided Caliphs and the other 
companions to have been infallible as a group due to their nearness to the Prophet, 
devotion to tawhid, and willing subservience to God, these earliest Muslims are not 
viewed as infallible as individuals.  Although very little is said about the actual misdeeds 
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of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and companions, several contemporary Salafist scholars 
acknowledged or hinted that transgressions did occur.  Despite these acknowledgements, 
however, individual misdeeds are assigned a low level of importance because the broader 
lesson—that the Rightly Guided Caliphs and companions, as a group, were faithful to 
God and to the teachings of the Prophet—is considered to be far more important. 
Within the contemporary Salafist narrative, several notable examples can be 
found where misdeeds of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and other companions of the 
Prophet were acknowledged.  In “The Advice of Skaykhul-Islaam Ibn Baaz (D. 1420H) 
to Usaamah Ibn Laadin al-Khaarijee,” bin Baz refuted the practice of criticizing rulers 
through the recounting of a hadith.  He explained how the Prophet’s beloved companion 
Usama ibn Zaid was once asked about his relationship with Uthman and whether he had 
ever confronted Uthman about potential wrong-doings.236  Usama did not deny that he 
had discussed such matters with the third Caliph, but exclaimed that anything spoken 
behind closed doors was no one else’s business.237  In addition to reinforcing the purist 
belief that rulers’ actions must not be judged without incontestable cause, Bin Baz’s 
perspective implies that Uthman’s actions, taken individually, were not infallible.  In his 
fatwa “The Authentic Creed and the Invalidators of Islam,” bin Baz explained that one of 
the reasons why the companions should be revered by modern-day Muslims was because 
“they [kept] their tongue in check regarding the arguments that arose amongst them and 
[believed] that they did their best to do only that which they believed was right.”238  This 
supports the theme that while disagreements and transgressions did occur, the 
companions, as a group, sought to act righteously.  Two additional examples are found in 
al-Albani’s writings.  In “The Sacred Salafee Methodology,” he too mentioned that the 
Salaf had disagreements amongst themselves and “[fell] into unintentional error at 
times.”239  In “Fataawaa of Shaikh Al-Albaanee,” he added that since the Rightly Guided 
Caliphs and companions of the Prophet are not individually infallible, they must not be 
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followed as individuals; instead, modern Muslims should heed their example and devote 
themselves only “to one individual . . . the Messenger of Allaah.”240   
While several contemporary Salafist scholars have acknowledged that the Rightly 
Guided Caliphs and companions of the Prophet, as individuals, were not perfect, 
disagreements and missteps are largely overlooked due to the greater importance of their 
generation’s devotion to God and His Messenger as a group.  An examination of these 
scholars’ writings reveals one specific reason why these transgressions are believed to 
have occurred: limited access to the hadiths.  In “The Sacred Salafee Methodology,” al-
Albani explained that the Salaf were in full concurrence about the fundamental principles 
of Islam and the importance of referring to the Qur’an and Sunna when disagreements 
needed to be settled.  However, at times, certain companions erred because they did not 
have access to a specific hadith that would have sufficiently addressed the question at 
hand.  Though they were sometimes wrong, al-Albani wrote that these erring companions 
still acted appropriately by using their best judgment based on the information available 
to them at the time.  He recounted that the Prophet foresaw this problem of limited access 
to hadiths when he decreed that “if an arbitrator gives a verdict based upon his personal 
reasoning (ijtihaad) and he is correct in that verdict, then he receives two rewards.  And if 
he makes an error then he receives only one.”241  For contemporary Salafists, the 
individuals who led the Umma during the Rightly Guided Caliphate period were not 
perfect—and this is especially true of those with limited knowledge of the Prophet’s 
actions and teachings—but their generation’s devotion to God and the Prophet as a whole 
exudes the infallibility that is worthy of emulation by modern believers.242 
3. Views on the Unity of the Umma 
Another topic associated with the Rightly Guided Caliphate that informs 
contemporary Salafist beliefs is their interpretation of the unity of the umma during this 
formative period.  As discussed earlier, contemporary Salafist scholars do not deny that 
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individual leaders erred during this time, but as a whole, the Salaf is remembered as 
being strongly united in its faith and interpretation of Islam.  In his essay entitled 
“Knowledge,” bin Baz explained that the companions, despite minor disagreements, were 
still completely unified on the most important issues, writing that “their call was one and 
their way was one, calling to the Book of Allaah and the Sunnah of the Messenger.”243  
This notion is reinforced by al-Albani, who wrote in his fatwa “The Sacred Salafee 
Methodology” that “the Salaf never disputed nor disagreed about the fundamentals of the 
Religion.”244  Contemporary Salafists of the jihadi inclination have taken the unity of the 
umma during the Rightly Guided Caliphate a step further and heavily romanticized it.  
Bin Laden harkened back to this unity when he proclaimed that the 9/11 attacks had 
reawakened a “spirit of brotherhood amongst Muslims” which would lead to “the 
unification of Muslims under the oneness of God and toward the establishment of the 
rightly guided caliphate.”245  The al-Qaeda mastermind also declared that Mohammad 
predicted the return of the Rightly Guided Caliphate, and with it, the unity that once 
characterized its umma.246 
Regarding the turmoil that characterized the period, the contemporary Salafist 
narrative does not deny that an exceedingly strong umma began to fracture, despite the 
faithfulness of the Salaf.  Contemporary Salafist scholars recount that the Prophet himself 
foresaw this.  Al-Albani discussed Mohammad’s prediction that the umma would begin 
to fracture when it started to stray from the beliefs and actions he and his companions 
exhibited.  Like other religions, the Prophet warned that the umma would break up into 
multiple sects, saying “the Jews have split and divided into seventy-one sects and the 
Christians have split and divided into seventy-two sects and my Ummah would split into 
seventy-three sects.  All of these sects will be in the Fire except one.”247  When asked 
which sect would be saved, the Prophet replied, “the one that adheres to what I and my 
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Companions adhere to.”248  In the same fatwa, al-Albani later explained that this 
fracturing occurred “even during the first century [of Islam] when some deviant sects 
started raising their voices and calling to that which contradicted the Qur’aan and the 
Sunnah by following their vain desires.”249  One of those deviant groups he referred to 
where the Kharijites.  Bin Baz expounded upon the damaging effects of the Kharijites, 
who “opposed ‘Uthmaan openly,” sparking the “fighting and corruption which has not 
ceased to affect the people to this day . . . and this caused the fitnah [or conflict] to occur 
between ‘Alee and Mu’aawiyah.”250  Bin Baz added that “a large number of Companions 
and others besides them were killed due to this open rebellion.”251  Thus, the strong unity 
of the umma during the Rightly Guided Caliphate period is seen as having begun to 
unravel as a result of the deviancy of the Kharijites.  
4. Perspective on the Sunni-Shi’a Rift 
For contemporary Salafists, the Kharijites are not the only deviant sect originating 
during the formative years of Islam that has had a negative effect on the trajectory of the 
Muslim faith.  Considered to be similarly damaging are the Shi’a, who trace their roots 
back to and revere the reign of Ali, the fourth caliph.  The Shi’a believe that Ali’s 
familial relationship with the Prophet should have solidified his place as the rightful 
successor and first caliph, and they lament the rejection of a hereditary system to replace 
each caliph after Mohammad’s death.  These notions are not looked upon favorably by 
contemporary Salafists.  Bin Baz makes his movement’s position on the Shi’a very clear.  
In “The Authentic Creed,” he relates that “they (the Sheites) hate the Prophet’s 
Companions, blaspheme them, and place the Prophet’s family members in a position 
higher than that Allah chose for them.”252  Bin Baz later explained that the Shi’a are just 
as deviant as “those who worship idols, angels, saints, the jinn, trees, and stones” and 
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therefore “have not followed the call of Allah’s Messengers.”253  They are likened to the 
Meccan idolaters who rejected the Prophet’s call to worship Allah during the earliest 
days of Islam.254 
While the contemporary Salafists’ scorn for the Shi’a sect is quite blatant, their 
narrative speaks no ill of the caliph Ali himself.  As noted earlier, al-Albani and bin-Baz 
blame the Kharijites for inciting the rebellion that led to the assassination of Uthman, the 
rift between Ali and Mu’awiyah, and the situation that forced the umma to choose sides 
in the civil war that set the conditions for the eventual divorce between Sunni and 
Shi’a.255  Indeed, the true formation of a Shi’a sect did not occur until well after the death 
of Ali.  Alienated by Mu’awiyah and his successor Yazid, Ali’s former followers 
convinced the fourth caliph’s son Hussein to lead a rebellion against the Umayyads and 
assume leadership of the caliphate by virtue of his blood ties to Mohammad.256  Unable 
to garner strong support, Hussein’s army was slaughtered by Umayyad forces near 
Karbala, Iraq.257  This lopsided defeat reinforced the Shi’a perspective that the 
Umayyads had inflicted great injustice against Ali’s family and solidified their resolve to 
break with their fellow Muslims.258  This party of Ali (Shi’at Ali, shortened to Shi’a) then 
began to develop its own religious traditions, practices, and leadership.  No indication 
was found in this study of the contemporary Salafist narrative that Ali should be blamed 
for the umma’s fracturing.  Like the transgressions of each of the other Rightly Guided 
Caliphs, any misdeeds committed by Ali are considered by contemporary Salafists to be 
of minor import because of his place within the righteous early generation of Muslims. 
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E. SUMMARY 
Contemporary Salafism is the successor of the modern Salafist movement that 
began in the late 1800s.  In response to the perceived decline of Muslim society in 
relation to the West, the modern Salafist movement advocated reforms within Islam to 
remedy that divergence.  Today, the movement seeks to return Muslim society to a pure 
and uncorrupted state.  The ideal example for belief and action, as specified by the 
Prophet, was the generation of Muslims who followed him—the righteous Salaf.  While 
differing factions within the contemporary Salafist movement advocate different means 
to achieve this return to the purity of the Salaf—purists favor knowledge and education, 
politicos favor political activism, and jihadis favor violence—they all share a belief in a 
common doctrine centered on the oneness of God (tawhid), strict adherence to the Qur’an 
and Sunna, and rejection of innovation (bid’a).  Since contemporary Salafists see Muslim 
society during the formative period of Islam as the embodiment of the principles they 
hold dear, much has been written about their beloved righteous predecessors.   
An examination of the contemporary Salafist narrative about the formative period 
of Islam, which includes the Rightly Guided Caliphate period, found several important 
themes.  First, the Salaf, in its entirety, is considered to be infallible.  This notion is taken 
directly from the Prophet’s declaration that his companions formed the greatest 
generation of Muslims because of their devotion to the Qur’an and Sunna and the 
contemporary Salafists’ interpretation that the Salaf vigorously opposed innovation.  
Second, any misdeeds committed by the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the companions of the 
Prophet, and other members of this honored generation do not detract from the Salaf’s 
faithfulness as a whole to the Qur’an and Sunna and were usually caused by a gaps in 
specific individuals’ access to and understanding of those two religious sources.  Third, 
the unity of the umma during the formative period of Islam was exceptionally strong, but 
it began to fray when deviant factions abandoned their devotion to the Qur’an and Sunna 
and fomented rebellion that eventually ripped the umma apart.  Fourth, the rift between 
Sunni and Shi’a, as detestable as contemporary Salafists believe the Shi’a became, was 
not portrayed as Ali’s doing.  As one of the most important members of the righteous 
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Salaf, Ali is revered with the other Rightly Guided Caliphs.  Instead, Kharijites are 
blamed for opening the rift that led to the eventual divorce of Sunni and Shi’a.   
These themes partially invalidate one aspect of this study’s second major 
hypothesis, which incorrectly assumed that the negative aspects of the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate were completely ignored.  To be sure, negative themes are paid little mention, 
but they are not wholly disregarded.  This study found that negative aspects of the 
Rightly Guided Caliphate, particularly the misdeeds of individuals within the Salaf, are 
indeed acknowledged.  In the case of those of the umma who were faithful, the misdeeds 
are downplayed as being far less important when contrasted with the righteousness of this 
early Muslim generation as a whole, and disagreements are said to have been the result of 
limited knowledge of the pertinent aspects of the Prophet’s Sunna.  For the most blatant 
aspects of the period’s turmoil, particularly Uthman’s assassination and the civil war that 
broke out between the followers of Ali and Mu’awiyah, the rebellious Kharijites are 
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IV. COMPETING ACCOUNTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In pursuit of an answer for why contemporary Salafists revere the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate period despite the turmoil and bloodshed that underlined it, this study has 
examined both the traditional historical account and the contemporary Salafist narrative 
of the period to better understand this apparent paradox.  An examination of the writings 
of several prominent Middle Eastern historians found that two important themes persisted 
during the period: the unity of the caliphate was perpetually threatened by factionalism 
and self-interest, and caliphal attempts to exert adequate political and religious control 
over the burgeoning empire were resisted on numerous levels, creating even more discord 
between its various factions.  A review of the contemporary Salafist narrative, derived 
from the teachings of some of the movement’s most influential leaders, espoused several 
of its own major themes.  First, contemporary Salafists regard the generation of Muslims 
living during the Rightly Guided Caliphate period, as a whole, to have been infallible due 
to their devotion to tawhid and subservience to God.  Second, members of this venerated 
generation are not considered to be infallible as individuals; they did commit misdeeds 
and have disagreements, but the transgressions are of such minor importance that they do 
not detract from the collective righteousness of the group as a whole.  Third, the unity of 
the umma during this period was exceptionally strong, even after deviant factions began 
to undermine it during Uthman’s tenure.  Fourth, Caliph Ali is not blamed for either the 
conflict between him and Mu’awiyah or the later formalization of the Shi’a sect, which 
contemporary Salafists consider deviant.   
Using the major themes collected from both accounts of the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate period, this chapter will outline the similarities and differences between the two 
versions to better understand the context of the contemporary Salafist narrative.  Proper 
context will show that the contemporary Salafist movement reveres the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate, despite its negative aspects, for two main reasons.  First, as the Prophet 
alluded—and contemporary Salafists interpret literally—the Rightly Guided Caliphate 
period is a time of nearly-perfect religious purity.  While that condition alone is highly 
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worthy of emulation, a second reason explains why contemporary Salafists are truly 
engrossed with the period: the Rightly Guided Caliphate’s tremendous temporal power.  
Despite other attractive periods in Muslim history, including the golden age that occurred 
several centuries later, the formative years of Islam represent both the spiritual and 
temporal pinnacle of Islamic society for the contemporary Salafist movement. 
B. COMMONALITIES WITHIN THE ACCOUNTS 
While a cursory glance at the traditional historical and contemporary Salafist 
accounts of the Rightly Guided Caliphate period seems to indicate the existence of two 
vastly different interpretations, a number of important similarities can be found between 
the two.  First, both accounts explain that key leaders within the righteous Salaf—from 
the caliphs themselves to the other companions of the Prophet—were not without their 
faults; disagreements did occur, and misdeeds were committed.  During the tumultuous 
years of Uthman’s reign, the traditional account discusses the displeasure of the elites 
within the state, which included many of the Prophet’s closest companions, over several 
caliphal policies that limited their influence.259  When angry Egyptian and Iraqi factions 
encircled the caliph’s home for nearly 50 days and demanded his resignation on charges 
of nepotism and corruption, the companions stood by idly, tacitly allowing Uthman to be 
murdered.260  Likewise, within the contemporary Salafist narrative, the existence of 
disagreements between Uthman and the other companions in the months leading up to his 
assassination were acknowledged, and a small signal was given that some of Uthman’s 
actions may have indeed been corrupt.261   
Second, both accounts reflect the existence of extreme internal strife within the 
caliphate, especially the rebellion against Uthman that led to his assassination and the 
civil war that ensued between the followers of Ali and Mu’awiyah.  As mentioned earlier, 
the traditional historical account discussed the circumstances surrounding Uthman’s 
murder at great length, describing the alienating effect that Uthman’s policies had on the 
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Egyptian and Iraqi provinces, the frenzied mob that demanded his resignation, and the 
cold-blooded manner in which he was cut down.262  The contemporary Salafist account 
alluded to the troubling situation as well, deriding the rebellious spirit of deviant 
Kharijites that fomented the controversy in the first place and later carried out the 
assassination.263  Similarly, the strife that existed between Ali and Mu’awiyah was 
chronicled within both the traditional historical sources and the contemporary Salafist 
narrative.  Both accounts mention the existence of rebellion and the large number of 
Muslim deaths that resulted—including those of a number of the companions 
themselves.264 
Third, when considering the practice of Islam, both accounts show that there was 
great unity throughout the umma during the Rightly Guided Caliphate period.  
Religiously, the Salaf were extremely loyal to the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet, and 
only minor differences in the earliest generation’s interpretation of Islam were mentioned 
by either source.  This religious unity was discussed exhaustively within the 
contemporary Salafist narrative by all key leaders surveyed in this study, including 
purists, political activists, and jihadis.  The traditional historical account also 
acknowledges the religious unity of the Salaf, despite the extreme political factionalism 
that was present at the time.  In God’s Rule—Government and Islam: Six Centuries of 
Medieval Islamic Political Thought, Crone provided an excellent explanation.  She 
likened the umma to a caravan traveling through the desert, following one path, behind 
the leadership of a knowledgeable guide.265  Just as members of a caravan could go 
astray if they did not follow the correct path, the umma was united in its practice of Islam 
as it navigated life and made its way along the only route to salvation.266       
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These three major similarities between the two accounts of the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate period reinforce the notion that the Salaf, as a whole, was extremely pious and 
that its members exercised their faith in a manner profoundly similar to the example 
given by the Prophet.  Though its leaders were imperfect, political and religious 
disagreements did occur, and significant bloodshed resulted from the worst disputes, the 
Rightly Guided Caliphate period was indeed a time of religious doctrinal unity.  As 
discussed Chapter IV of this study, contemporary Salafists revere the righteous 
predecessors who lived during this formative period for their devotion to God and to the 
practices and teachings of the Prophet.  The traditional historical account of the period 
reinforces the veracity of a religiously-pure umma during this important time, making the 
contemporary Salafist emulation of that aspect of the Rightly Guided Caliphate very 
understandable. 
C. MAJOR DISPARITIES 
Although important similarities are found between the two separate accounts of 
the story of the Rightly Guided Caliphate, major differences do indeed exist.  The first 
major difference surrounds the scope of the individual imperfections and disagreements 
found amongst the period’s leaders.  While both accounts acknowledge that key leaders 
within the Salaf made mistakes and had disagreements between themselves, the 
contemporary Salafist narrative provided a much more forgiving analysis than the 
traditional historical account.  This study’s survey of key contemporary Salafist leaders’ 
writings found only scant mention of misdeeds committed by the companions of the 
Prophet, while the traditional account mentions a good number of them.  For example, 
Uthman’s possible nepotism was only slightly hinted at by bin Baz, yet the traditional 
historical account contained significant discussion of Umar’s harsh treatment of the 
Persians; the rebellious nature of A’isha, Talha, and Zubayr, as demonstrated by their 
withdrawal of support for Uthman in the days before his death; and the trio’s subsequent 
rebellion against Ali.267  Similarly, disagreements between the companions such as those 
previously mentioned are highlighted by the traditional historical account because of their 
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profound impact on the caliphate, while the contemporary Salafist narrative downplays 
the severity and impact of any disagreements by arguing that the minor ones were caused 
by limited access to specific aspects of the Prophet’s Sunna and implying that the major 
ones were instigated by rebellious Kharijites rather than the companions themselves.268 
The second major difference between the two accounts of the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate is found in the perceived magnitude of political divisions that existed between 
different factions throughout the period.  This study’s review of the contemporary 
Salafist narrative found no mention of two watershed internal conflicts: the Wars of 
Apostasy and the Battle of the Camel.  Both of these conflicts were extremely significant 
because of the level of violence that occurred and their potential to profoundly alter the 
trajectory of Islamic history.  Though unmentioned by the contemporary Salafist 
narrative, traditional historical sources address both conflicts in great detail; the Wars of 
Apostasy are described as a critical episode that preserved the caliphate during an early 
existential crisis, and the Battle of the Camel is recounted as both the first outbreak of 
violence between companions and the first major threat to Ali’s reign as caliph—a reign 
that eventually ended in failure.269 
Regarding the Rightly Guided Caliphate’s underlying political disharmony and 
episodic periods of strife, the differences between the two accounts this study examined 
are profound.  While the contemporary Salafists’ reverence for the religious purity of the 
Salaf is completely understandable, their narrative’s omission of many of the details 
surrounding the worst cases of Muslim-verses-Muslim bloodshed, the willingness of 
some companions to direct violence against others, and the severe factionalism that 
existed is enormously puzzling.  Moreover, the admission that key leaders within the 
Salaf were indeed fallible makes the omissions even more perplexing.  Since 
contemporary Salafists imply that the fallibility of individuals did not detract from the 
religious purity of the Salaf as a group, the turmoil of the period could be explained as the 
result of human error that, despite its egregiousness, still did not invalidate the overall 
                                                 
268 Al-Albani, “Sacred Salafee Methodology;” Bin Baz, “The Advice of Shaykhul-Islaam Ibn Baaz,” 
2, 8. 
269 Shaban, Islamic History, 23, 25; Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests, 55–56. 
 72 
infallibility of this earliest Muslim generation.  Viewed in this context, the blatant 
omission of these painful historical details suggests that contemporary Salafists are less 
concerned about the credibility of their account of the Salaf’s religious purity than they 
are about how these details could undermine the amount of temporal power attributed to 
the early Islamic caliphate.   
The first major omission, the Wars of Apostasy waged against the tribes that 
decided to secede from the Islamic state after the death of Mohammad, had far less to do 
with religion than the preservation of the state’s temporal power.  Mohammad’s personal 
influence over these tribes was immensely strong, but their secession after his death—
despite their desire to continue the practice of Islam—is indicative of the simultaneous 
religious unity of the umma and political factionalism of the state.  Similarly, the Battle 
of the Camel, which pitted the companions against each other shortly after Ali’s 
ascension to the post of caliph, was instigated by some of the Prophet’s closest 
companions in an effort to maintain the temporal status quo.  In this conflict, it was the 
political unity of the state, rather than the religious unity of the umma, that was called 
into question.  While each of these violent clashes by themselves demonstrates the 
significant political discord that existed during the Rightly Guided Caliphate period, they 
represent only a small part of the greater underlying tensions that weakened the temporal 
strength of the state during the time.  As discussed in Chapter II, the perpetual tension 
between the elites within the core of the state, between the core and the periphery, and 
between the provinces themselves continually undermined the caliphate’s political unity 
and was barely kept in check by external conquest.  It is this reverence for the temporal 
strength of the Rightly Guided Caliphate, and desire to return the Muslim community to a 
position of relevance within the world order through religious purity, that explains why 
these key historical aspects are omitted from the contemporary Salafists’ interpretation of 
the period. 
D. SUMMARY 
This study’s comparison of the historical reality of the Rightly Guided Caliphate 
with the contemporary Salafist narrative of the period indicates one major, underlying 
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reason why contemporary Salafists of every faction celebrate this brief portion of Islamic 
history as the one most worthy of emulation, despite the remarkable turmoil that 
characterized it.  Much like their late nineteenth-century predecessors, contemporary 
Salafists want more than a religiously-pure Muslim society; they yearn for an Islamic 
domain with great temporal power that rivals the rest of the world, yet does not conform 
to secularism to obtain it.  In their interpretation, the caliphate’s temporal power and its 
umma’s religious purity during this vaunted period represent everything each 
contemporary Salafist faction wants the Muslim world to become—albeit through 
different methods.   
Contemporary Salafists’ desire to preserve the memory of the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate as both a great temporal power and religiously-pure dominion, combined with 
their omission of many important details surrounding the factionalism and conflict that 
persisted during its reign, validate this study’s second major hypothesis, with one slight 
nuance.  Contemporary Salafists seek to reinvent the period in a way that better supports 
their religious and political objectives, but as explained in Chapter IV, they do not 
completely ignore all negative aspects of the Rightly Guided Caliphate.  Instead, some 
negative aspects are acknowledged, but are explained in a way that reinforces the 
movement’s key concepts, including the importance of heeding the Prophet’s Sunna and 
the detrimental effects that innovation creates for an otherwise faithful community of 
believers. 
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A. SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH CONDUCTED 
Contemporary Salafism, as an extension of the modern Salafist movement that 
began in the late 1800s, seeks to address the decline of Muslim society relative to the 
West.  It posits that this upsetting divergence has occurred because Muslims have strayed 
from the true path of Islam, which requires a strict adherence to the Qur’an and the Sunna 
as it was interpreted by the Prophet’s companions.  Consequently, the lives of the 
righteous Salaf—the first generation of Muslims who lived during Mohammad’s time 
and through the Rightly Guided Caliphate period—are of paramount importance to 
contemporary Salafists.  The period is both revered and emulated by contemporary 
Salafists as a model for today’s Muslims to follow.  Since the period was wrought with 
significant turmoil and violence, including the assassination of three of the four ruling 
caliphs, the outbreak of four bloody rebellions, continuous infighting between the 
Prophet’s closest companions, the virtual split of the caliphate into two separate states, 
and the birth of the Sunni-Shi’a rift, its emulation appears to be highly illogical.  This 
study attempts to understand the contemporary Salafist movement’s paradoxical 
emulation of the Rightly Guided Caliphate period by examining both the traditional 
historical account of the period and the Salafi narrative.  Through comparative analysis of 
the two competing accounts, this study’s conclusion is that contemporary Salafists 
emulate the Rightly Guided Caliphate period because it represents a time of not only 
religious purity, which is clearly important to them, but also of unrivaled temporal power.   
A detailed examination of the traditional historical account of the Rightly Guided 
Caliphate yielded several important insights into this highly complex period.  First, on a 
political level, the influence of factionalism and the prevalence of group-interest posed a 
constant threat to the unity of the caliphate.  Second, each of the four Rightly Guided 
Caliphs struggled to exert the level of political and religious control over the state that 
was necessary to maintain unity in the face of this pervading factionalism.  Caliphal 
assertions of power were resisted—sometimes bloodily—by those who benefited from 
the status quo.  Ironically, this violent resistance sometimes originated from the ranks of 
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the Prophet’s closest companions.  Finally, the political discord that characterized the 
period was offset by the religious unity of the umma.  The preponderance of violence that 
occurred during the period resulted from conflicts over the allocation of power and 
influence, not over the practice of religion.  Although the Rightly Guided Caliphate 
expanded at a seemingly miraculous pace, the political factionalism that underlined it 
eventually brought it to a bitter end.    
A survey of the contemporary Salafist narrative of the period also yielded several 
major insights.  First, contemporary Salafists regard the righteous Salaf, as a group, to 
have been infallible.  This interpretation is taken directly from the Prophet himself, when 
he declared that his generation was the greatest of all Muslims, and is supplemented by 
the contemporary Salafist reflection that the companions were exceptionally 
knowledgeable, righteous, and devoted.  Second, while the people who comprised the 
earliest generation of Muslims were not infallible as individuals, their transgressions and 
disagreements were small in scope, did not detract from the overall righteousness of the 
Salaf, and were caused by specific individuals’ limited access to certain aspects of the 
Prophet’s Salaf.  Third, the umma was exceptionally unified during the period until 
deviant factions strayed from the Qur’an and Sunna by rousing rebellion that led to the 
assassination of Uthman and conflict between Ali and Mu’awiyah.  Fourth, the rift 
between Sunni and Shi’a, as detestable as Salafists believe the Shi’a became, is not seen 
as Ali’s fault.  As one of the most important members of the righteous Salaf, Ali is 
revered by contemporary Salafists along with the other Rightly Guided Caliphs.  Instead, 
rebellious Kharijites are blamed for opening the rift that led to the eventual divorce of 
Sunni and Shi’a. 
This study’s comparison of both competing accounts led to the conclusion that 
contemporary Salafists emulate the Rightly Guided Caliphate, despite the enormous 
turmoil that accompanied it, because they are enamored by its temporal power as much as 
by its religious purity.  Several factors explain this conclusion.  First, important details 
that would damage the remembrance of the Rightly Guided Caliphate as a temporal 
power—but not necessarily its reputation for religious purity—are omitted from the 
narrative.  Since contemporary Salafists argue that disputes between even the most 
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prominent members of the Salaf did not detract from the overall religious purity of the 
generation, the bloody rebellions and infighting between the companions that occurred 
could be similarly explained.  Instead, these historically painful episodes are omitted 
from their narrative to avoid detracting from an account of the caliphate as a politically-
united and temporally-powerful entity.  Since religious purity and temporal power are 
both essential aspects of the Rightly Guided Caliphate that contemporary Salafists point 
to for emulation, political factionalism doesn’t fit into the narrative.  Second, the 
contemporary Salafist goal of returning Islamic society to a position of prominence 
through religious purification finds an excellent example in a Rightly Guided Caliphate 
seen as both temporally-powerful and religiously-pure.  Religious purity is really only a 
means to an end, and for this reason, both the political and religious strength of the 
caliphate is enormously appealing.  Since it possessed the temporal strength to challenge 
its Western enemies and a religious infallibility that can never again be matched, the 
Rightly Guided Caliphate is revered and emulated by the contemporary Salafist 
movement. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study’s message, that the contemporary Salafist movement reveres the 
Rightly Guided Caliphate period for both the temporal power it epitomized and its 
religious purity, must not be prematurely interpreted as cause for concern.  Instead, it 
must be understood that the movement’s unique belief structure presents a number of 
opportunities for improved global security that Western national security professionals 
would be wise to take advantage of.  Two major aspects of this belief structure, in 
particular, are noteworthy.  First, while some contemporary Salafist factions are eager to 
employ violence to purify Muslim society and return it to predominance, many Salafists 
reject the practice as innovation.270  Indeed, several of the purist scholars surveyed in this 
study vehemently argued against the use of violence.  This divide between Salafists who 
embrace the notion of purification through knowledge or political action and those who 
prefer the shortcut of violence must be exploited in a way that strengthens the position of 
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those contemporary Salafists who seek peace while marginalizing those who do not.  
Cooperation with those in a unique position to undermine jihadism on ideological and 
religious grounds is clearly in the American national interest.   
The second opportunity that can be found within the contemporary Salafist belief 
system is demonstrated by the growing number of Salafi political parties dedicated to 
legitimate, non-violent political action.  The ascension of Salafi political blocs in Kuwait 
and Bahrain and the birth of numerous parties in post-Arab Spring Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, 
Syria, and Lebanon indicate a willingness of many Salafists to eschew their long histories 
of opposition to popular sovereignty and to embrace democracy as a means of 
governance.271  Though young democracies are notoriously unstable—and breakdowns 
in their typically fragile political systems often lead to bloodshed—the contemporary 
Salafists’ initial gravitation to politics instead of violence in the aforementioned cases is 
extremely reassuring.272  Several promising signs are found in Egypt, particularly, where 
Salafi political parties have recently demonstrated a preference for peaceful dispute 
resolution.  Salafists were deeply involved in mediation between the Morsi government 
and militant Sinai jihadis in 2012 and 2013 and, more recently, have urged the military to 
reconcile with the Muslim Brotherhood after the latter was ousted in the summer of 
2013.273  Western national security professionals must exploit these peaceful overtures 
by encouraging contemporary Salafist political parties to stand for pluralism, dialogue, 
compromise, and peaceful activism.  
While it is true that contemporary Salafists view the West with great suspicion, 
their continuing growth and expanding influence throughout several regions of the world 
requires that today’s national security professionals refrain from oversimplifying the 
beliefs and composition of the movement and immediately classifying it as a threat.  
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Although friendship with the contemporary Salafist movement is largely an unrealistic 
goal, cooperation and peaceful coexistence is not.  Understanding contemporary 
Salafists’ peaceful inclinations is the first necessary step towards forging an acceptable 
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